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We study second-degree price discrimination in markets where the product traded by the
monopolist is access to other agents. We derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the welfare-
and the pro￿t-maximizing mechanisms to employ a single network or a menu of non-exclusive
networks. We characterize the optimal matching schedules under a wide range of preferences,
derive implications for prices, and deliver testable predictions relating the structure of the optimal
pricing strategies to conditions on the distribution of match qualities. Our analysis sheds light
on the distortions associated with the private provision of broadcasting, health insurance and job
matching services.
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This paper studies second-degree price discrimination in markets where the product sold by a plat-
form is access to other agents. In such markets, platforms o⁄er menus of matching plans at di⁄erent
prices. For concreteness, consider the problem of a Cable TV provider contracting with TV channels
on one side of the market and with viewers on the other side. The cable company￿ s problem can
be seen from two perspectives. The more familiar one is that of designing a menu of packages of
channels to o⁄er to viewers. The mirror image of this problem consists in designing a matching
schedule for channels where prices are contingent on the viewers that each channel is able to reach
(more viewers yield higher advertising revenue). The menu of packages of channels o⁄ered to viewers
determines the matching schedule faced by channels, while the matching schedule o⁄ered to channels
determines the packages that the platform can o⁄er to viewers. As a consequence, when designing
its menus on each side, the cable company has to internalize the cross-side e⁄ects on pro￿ts that
each side induces on the other side.
Similar problems emerge in many other two-sided matching markets. Consider, for example, the
provision of health care services. Health care providers o⁄er menus of health plans that di⁄er in the
access that patients (on one side of the market) have to doctors (on the other side). Here too, the
plans that the platform o⁄ers to patients determine the services that the platform has to procure
on the doctor side. As such, market conditions on the doctor side determine the pro￿tability of
price-discriminatory strategies on the patient side.
The presence of such cross-side e⁄ects is what distinguishes price discrimination in many-to-many
matching markets from price discrimination in markets for standard products. Other examples of
price discrimination in many-to-many matching markets can be found in online advertising, credit
cards markets, as well as in the practices followed by online employment agencies and business
directories.
This paper builds a model that examines the implications of such cross-side e⁄ects for questions
such as: What matching allocations and network structures are likely to emerge under pro￿t maxim-
ization (private provision of matching services) and which ones under welfare maximization (public
provision)? How are these allocations a⁄ected by shocks that alter the distribution of valuations
and/or the attractiveness of the two sides? What price schemes sustain such allocations?
Model preview. We consider the problem of a monopolistic platform that operates in a market
with two sides. What prevents the platform from appropriating the entire surplus is the fact that each
agent from each side has private information both about his willingness to pay for the quality of his
matching set (his valuation) and about various idiosyncratic characteristics that determine the agent￿ s
attractiveness for the other side. Consider the Cable TV example. In addition to his willingness to
pay for the various packages, each viewer is likely to possess private information about idiosyncratic
characteristics (e.g., educational background, consumption habits, income, etc.) that determine the
advertising revenue that the channels expect from reaching the viewer. Likewise, channels have
1private information both about the revenue that they expect from reaching the viewers, as well as
about the attractiveness of the shows and of the advertisement that they broadcast. Similarly, in the
context of health care provision, patients possess private information both about their willingness to
pay to join di⁄erent networks as well as about idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g., health status, life
style, various risks) that determine the surplus that the physicians obtain from being matched to
these patients (as these characteristics a⁄ect the di¢ culty of the treatment, for instance).
All agents from the same side agree on the quality of the agents from the other side, but di⁄er
in their willingness to pay for such quality (vertical di⁄erentiation). Importantly, we allow such
valuations to be negative for some agents: For example, in the case of health care provision, a
physician￿ s (negative) willingness to pay for accepting additional patients may originate from the
physician￿ s opportunity cost of time.
In such an environment, the platform￿ s problem consists in choosing a menu of matching plans for
each side of the market. Each item in the menu speci￿es a set of agents of given characteristics from
the other side, along with a price. The objective is to characterize the pro￿t-maximizing menus and
compare the network allocations that they induce with the ones induced under welfare-maximization.
In order to address these issues in full generality (i.e., without imposing a priori restrictions on the
possible matching and pricing strategies), we follow a mechanism design approach. We recast the
platform￿ s problem as designing a matching rule together with a pricing rule so as to maximize
pro￿ts or welfare. A matching rule assigns each agent from each side to a set of agents from the
other side. We only impose that these rules satisfy a minimal feasibility constraint, which we call
reciprocity. This condition requires that if agent i from side A is matched to agent j from side B;
then agent j is matched to agent i: In the Cable TV example, if viewer John is matched to BBC
News, then BBC News is matched to John.
Main Results. As is standard, the problem of designing pro￿t-maximizing menus can be re-
casted entirely in terms of designing the matching rules that they induce. This makes the pro￿t-
maximization problem analogous to welfare-maximization, except that the agents￿valuations are
replaced by their virtual counterparts, i.e., they are discounted by informational rents.1 Hereafter,
we will thus refer to both the pro￿t-maximizing and the welfare-maximizing rules as the optimal
rules, and will often refrain from distinguishing between the two, when not needed.
Our ￿rst result shows that, under two reasonable conditions, optimal rules discriminate only along
the willingness-to-pay dimension. In other words, two agents with the same valuation are matched
to the same group of agents, irrespective of di⁄erences in other unobservable characteristics. These
conditions are (i) (weakly) decreasing marginal utility for match quality, and (ii) (weakly) positive
a¢ liation between willingness to pay and attractiveness. The ￿rst condition is self-explanatory.
The second condition implies that willingness to pay and attractiveness are either independent or
positively correlated. In the context of Cable TV, this assumption means that the channels that are
1The virtual valuation of an agent coincides with the marginal revenue that the agent brings to the monopolist (see,
e.g., Bulow and Roberts (1989)).
2willing to pay the most for viewers (e.g., because their advertisers are willing to pay the most) o⁄er,
in general, better shows and more pleasant advertisement. Likewise, the viewers who are willing to
pay the most for better packages are the ones that the channels view as the most pro￿table ones
(e.g., because these are the viewers preferred by advertisers). In the context of health care provision,
where valuations are typically negative on the physicians￿side re￿ ecting the latter￿ s opportunity cost
of time, this assumption means that those patients with the highest willingness to pay to join larger
networks are, on average, those that demand the most intensive care from physicians.2 Likewise,
those physicians with the lowest opportunity cost for serving more patients (equivalently, with the
highest valuation to join the network) are those that the patients value the most at the ex-ante stage,
i.e., before learning their speci￿c illnesses (these physicians are, typically, the generalists). Clearly,
because the assumption only requires a¢ liation to be weak, the analysis also applies to all markets
where, a priori, there are no good reasons to expect willingness to pay and attractiveness to be
correlated.
Our second result shows that the optimal matching rules have a threshold structure, according
to which each agent is matched to all agents from the other side whose marginal willingness to pay
for match quality is above some threshold. To understand both results, note that, under positive
a¢ liation, the expected attractiveness of each agent from each side increases with the agent￿ s will-
ingness to pay. Moreover, under diminishing marginal utility, using the same agent as an input to
provide match quality to many agents is less costly than using di⁄erent agents. These two properties,
along with the fact that asymmetric information poses restrictions on the way the match quality can
vary with both attractiveness and willingness to pay, imply that the cost-minimizing way to provide
a given match quality to an agent with a given willingness to pay is to match him to all agents
from the other side whose willingness to pay is high enough, irrespective of all other dimensions that
determine attractiveness.
Building on these results, we then show that the optimal rules belong to one of the following two
classes, and identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for each of the two classes to be optimal. The
￿rst class consists of matching rules that employ a single network. Here, any two agents from the same
side whose matching set is non-empty have the same matching set. A single network is thus the analog
in matching environments to a single price (that is, the absence of quantity/quality discrimination) in
the context of a single-product monopolist. The second class is that of nested multi-homing matching
rules. These rules are implemented by o⁄ering a menu of non-exclusive networks (this is known as
multi-homing in the literature on two-sided markets) and setting prices so that agents with a higher
willingness to pay join all networks that lower willingness-to-pay agents join and possibly a few more
(therefore the quali￿cation nested). Nested multi-homing is the equivalent in matching environments
2In general, having more patients in the network with a high willingness to pay may also mean a higher revenue
for the physicians (the precise characterization depending on the sharing rule between the physicians and the health
care provider). The statement in the main text is for given expected revenue. Holding constant this revenue, having
more patients in the network with a higher wilingness to pay then implies a higher opportunity cost of time under the
assumption that willingness to pay is positively a¢ liated with the required intensity of care.
3to active quantity/quality price discrimination by a single-product monopolist.
We prove that a single network is optimal if and only if, starting from a complete network (i.e., a
network that includes all agents from both sides) removing the link between the two agents from each
side with the lowest (virtual) valuations, while leaving all other links untouched, decreases (pro￿ts)
welfare. When this is not the case, then the optimal matching rule exhibits nested multi-homing.
To understand the intuition for this result, consider the platform￿ s pro￿t-maximization problem (the
welfare problem is analogous). Let us analyze ￿rst the situation where virtual valuations are positive
for all agents from both sides. In such a case, the platform￿ s marginal revenue of expanding the
matching set of any agent is positive. Accordingly, pro￿t-maximization clearly requires that each
agent be matched to all other agents from the opposite side, i.e., a single complete network.
Things are di⁄erent (and more interesting) when virtual valuations are negative for certain types.
In this case, by the same reasoning as above, all agents with positive virtual valuations should be
matched to all agents with positive virtual valuations from the other side. However, the platform can
increase pro￿ts by adding to the matching sets of those agents with high positive virtual valuations
some agents from the other side with negative virtual valuations. This cross-subsidization strategy is
a general feature of matching markets, in which the platform is willing to accept revenue losses on one
side to boost rent extraction on the other side. Whether, at the optimum, this cross-subsidization
leads to a single network or to multi-homing is then determined by the marginal e⁄ect on pro￿ts of
linking the two agents with the lowest virtual valuations. If the e⁄ect is positive, then the optimal
matching rule consists in creating a single complete network (that is, a network that includes all
agents from both sides). If the e⁄ect is negative, then instead of creating a single, but incomplete
network, the platform can do strictly better by separating agents based on their virtual valuations.
Those agents with high virtual valuations are assigned matching sets which are supersets of those
assigned to agents with lower virtual valuations; that is, the optimal matching rule induces nested
multi-homing.
We then proceed by o⁄ering a complete characterization of the optimal matching rules. When
nested multi-homing is optimal (this is the most interesting case), we show that the thresholds that
de￿ne the matching sets of each agent are given by an Euler equation that equalizes the marginal
(revenue) e¢ ciency gains from expanding the matching set on one side to the marginal (revenue)
e¢ ciency losses that, by reciprocity, arise on the other side of the market. Intuitively, this optimality
condition endogenously separate agents from each side into two groups. The ￿rst group is that of
agents who play the role of consumers. These agents generate positive marginal revenues to the
platform by ￿purchasing￿ sets of agents from the other side of the market. The second group is
that of agents who play the role of inputs. These agents generate negative marginal revenues to the
platform, but serve to ￿feed￿ the matching demand of agents-consumers on the other side of the
market.
Building on the work of Wilson (1997), we derive a pricing formula that relates (observable)
marginal prices to the elasticities of the demand for matching services on both sides of the market.
4Intuitively, this formula derives the optimal price schedule by setting marginal prices for each ad-
ditional match quality so that the marginal revenue gains from expanding the matching sets sold
to agents-consumers on one side of the market equals the marginal costs of procuring agents-inputs
from the opposite side. Interestingly, these marginal costs are endogenous and depend on the entire
network structure of the matching allocations.
Similarly to the standard price discrimination problem analyzed in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and
Maskin and Riley (1984), we identify conditions that ensure that the platform is willing to separate
types as ￿nely as possible. It turns out that the familiar regularity condition (Myerson, 1981),
according to which virtual valuations are monotonically increasing, is not the right condition in our
matching environment. As pointed out by Bulow and Roberts (1989), this condition implies that
the marginal e⁄ect on revenue of increasing trade is greater for agents with higher valuations. In
a standard setting, because the marginal cost is independent of the agent￿ s type, the monotonicity
of the virtual valuations then implies the monotonicity of the trades. In contrast, in a matching
environment, by virtue of reciprocity, the marginal cost of increasing the trade of some agent is the
revenue loss of adding the agent to the matching sets of other agents from the opposite side. Since
attractiveness and valuation are potentially correlated, the marginal cost of increasing trade is also
a function of the agent￿ s valuation. For the optimal matching rule to separate types as ￿nely as
possible, one must then require that the virtual valuations increase faster with the true valuations
than their corresponding marginal cross-side e⁄ects. In analogy to Myerson (1981), we refer to this
condition as Strong Regularity. Under this condition, bunching can occur only at ￿the top￿(i.e., for
the highest valuation agents) due to capacity constraints, that is, because the stock of agents from
the other side of the market has been exhausted.
Public and Private Provision of Matching Services. The above results have implications
for the public and private provision of matching services. Because true valuations are always larger
than their virtual analogs, our results imply that single networks are more often associated with
welfare-maximizing platforms, while multi-homing is more often associated with pro￿t-maximizing
platforms. This prediction appears consistent with casual empiricism: The public provision of broad-
casting, health insurance, and job-matching services tends to employ a single network structure, while
their private counterparts often o⁄er discriminatory menus (that is, multi-homing matching rules).
Overall, pro￿t-maximization leads to two distortions relative to e¢ ciency. First, there is an
exclusion e⁄ect, whereby too many agents are completely excluded from the market. For example, in
the context of health care provision, too many patients are left without any insurance. The second
distortion is in the form of an isolation e⁄ect, whereby each agent who is not excluded is matched
only to a subset of his e¢ cient matching set. Unlike in standard mechanism design problems, this
distortion applies also to those agents with the highest valuations. The reason is that, although the
virtual valuations of these agents coincide with the true ones, the cost of cross-subsidizing these agents
is always higher under pro￿t maximization than under welfare maximization. This is because such
cost is proportional to the true valuation of the marginal agent from the opposite side under welfare
5maximization and to the virtual valuation of the marginal agent under pro￿t maximization. Because
virtual valuations are always lower than true valuations for the marginal agents, the matching sets are
strictly smaller under pro￿t maximization than under welfare maximization for all agents, including
those at the top of the distribution.
Testable Predictions. The analysis also delivers various testable predictions about the e⁄ects
of shocks that alter the distributions of individual characteristics a⁄ecting the attractiveness of the
two sides and/or their willingness to pay to reach the other side.
In the context of the Cable TV application, consider, for example, a positive shock to the viewers￿
income (not necessarily uniform across viewers) that leaves unchanged the viewers￿willingness to pay
but raises the pro￿ts that the channels expect from reaching the viewers (e.g., via an increase in
advertising revenue). Now consider a viewer with a positive virtual valuation. If nested multi-homing
was optimal before the shock, then the package o⁄ered to this viewer includes channels with a negative
virtual valuation. Because the losses that the platform incurs with these channels increase with the
viewer￿ s attractiveness, the platform￿ s optimal response to such a shock is to reduce the viewer￿ s
matching set by taking o⁄ some of the negative virtual-valuation channels. Next, consider a viewer
with a negative virtual valuation. Because the original matching set of such viewer includes only
positive virtual-valuation channels, the optimal response to such a shock is to expand the viewer￿ s
matching set. In other words, the model predicts that the platform￿ s optimal response to such
shocks is to improve the quality of the ￿basic￿packages (those targeted to low-valuation viewers)
and worsen the quality of the ￿premium￿packages (those targeted to high-valuation viewers). In
terms of consumer surplus, these shocks make low-end viewers better o⁄ at the expenses of high-end
ones.
Group-design Problem. A related problem is that of a principal operating in a single-sided
market populated by multiple agents who experience di⁄erentiated peer e⁄ects from the agents
they interact with. In this setting, the principal￿ s problem consists in assigning the agents to non-
exclusive groups (rather than networks). This one-sided group formation problem is equivalent to
a two-sided matching problem where both sides have symmetric primitives and where the platform
is constrained to selecting a symmetric matching rule. As it turns out, in two-sided markets with
symmetric primitives, the optimal matching rules are naturally symmetric. Therefore, all our results
naturally extend to single-sided matching problems. It su¢ ces to replace ￿single network￿by ￿single
group￿and ￿nested multi-homing matching rule￿by ￿mutually non-exclusive groups￿ . In particular,
our results can be applied to problems in organization economics (e.g., the design of teams).
Outline of the Paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Below, we close the
introduction by brie￿ y reviewing the pertinent literature. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the main results: First, it identi￿es necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the optimal
matching rule to employ a single network or to exhibit nested multi-homing. Next, it characterizes the
optimal matching rules, and discusses the distortions caused by pro￿t maximization relative to welfare
maximization. It also derives testable predictions for the e⁄ects of shocks that alter the distribution
6of valuations and/or the distribution of attributes that determine the agents￿attractiveness. Section
4 discusses various extensions and concludes. All proofs omitted in the main text are either in the
Appendix at the end of the document or in the Online Supplementary Material.
Related Literature
The paper is related to the following literatures.
Price discrimination. The paper contributes to the literature on second-degree price discrim-
ination (e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1983), Wilson (1997)) by considering a
setting where the product sold by the monopolist is access to other agents.3 The study of price
discrimination in many-to-many matching markets brings two novelties relative to the standard
monopolistic screening problem. First, the platform￿ s feasibility constraint (namely, the reciprocity
of the matching rule) has no equivalent in markets for commodities. Second, each agent is both a
consumer and an input in the matching production function. The ￿consumer￿role of an agent is
summarized in his willingness to pay, while the ￿input￿role is captured by the idiosyncratic charac-
teristics that determine the agent￿ s attractiveness to the other side. This feature of matching markets
implies that the cost of procuring an input is endogenous and it depends in a nontrivial way on the
entire matching rule.
Two-Sided Markets. Markets where agents purchase access to other agents are the focus of the
literature that studies monopolistic pricing in two-sided markets. This literature, however, restricts
attention to a single network or to mutually exclusive networks (e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006),
Armstrong (2006), Hagiu (2008), Ambrus and Argenziano (2009), and Weyl (2010)).4 In contrast, we
assume that platforms can design arbitrary matching rules and provide conditions for the optimality
of a single network relative to more sophisticated network structures (such as those associated with
multi-homing matching rules).
Matching Design with Transfers. In the context of one-to-one matching, Damiano and Li
(2007) and Johnson (2010) derive conditions on primitives for a pro￿t-maximizing platform to induce
positive assortative matching. In turn, Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) derive one-to-one positive
assortative matching as the equilibrium outcome of a costly signaling game. In contrast, we study
second-degree price discrimination in many-to-many matching environments.
Group Design. As anticipated above, our two-sided matching model can be applied to solve
(one-sided) group design problems with peer e⁄ects. Arnott and Rowse (1987) and Lazear (2001)
study the problem of a school that, under complete information, wants to allocate students to
disjoint classes. Besides restricting attention to mutually exclusive groups, these papers disregard
the incomplete information issues that lie at the core of the present work.5 Under incomplete
information, Board (2009) and Rayo (2010) study pro￿t-maximization by a monopolistic platform
3For models of second-degree price discrimination on quality, see Deneckere and McAfee (1996), Ellison and Fuden-
berg (2000) and Anderson and Dana (2009).
4See Rysman (2009) for a recent survey of the two-sided markets literature.
5See also Epple and Romano (1998) and Helsley and Strange (2000).
7that can induce agents to self-select into mutually exclusive groups. Relative to these papers, we
extend the analysis of matching design to two-sided environments and allow for matching rules that
assign agents to non-exclusive groups.6
Decentralized Matching. In a decentralized economy, Shimer and Smith (2000), Shimer
(2005), Smith (2006), Atakan (2006), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) consider extensions of the
assignment model of Becker (1973) to a setting with search/matching frictions. These papers show
that the resulting one-to-one matching allocation is positive assortative provided that the match
value function satis￿es strong forms of supermodularity. Relative to this literature, we abstract from
search frictions and consider many-to-many matching rules.
Double Auctions. A large literature starting with the seminal works of Myerson and Sat-
terhwaite (1983) and Crampton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) (see for example McAfee (1991),
McAfee (1992a), Fieseler, Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2003), and Jehiel and Pauzner (2006)) study
the (non-)existence of e¢ cient trading mechanisms between a ￿nite number of buyers and sellers.
Alternatively, Gresik and Satterthwaite (1983), Satterthwaite and Williams (1989), McAfee (1992b),
Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994) and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) study the e¢ ciency
properties of double auctions in the limit as the number of buyers and sellers increase. In these mod-
els, quantities are rival goods across buyers and sellers: As buyers consume more, sellers consume
less (or face higher production costs). In contrast, by virtue of reciprocity, in our model matching
quality is nonrival across sides. This property is the key di⁄erence between matching and trading
markets.
2 Model
A monopolistic platform is in the business of bringing together agents from two sides of a market.
Each side k;l 2 fA;Bg is populated by a unit-mass continuum of agents indexed by i;j 2 [0;1].
Each agent i from each side k has a type ￿i
k = (ui
k;vi
k) 2 ￿k ￿ Uk ￿ Vk that has two components.
The ￿rst component ui
k is a vector of individual characteristics that determines the attractiveness
of agent i as seen by each agent j from side l 6= k: The second component vi
k is a scalar parameter
that describes agent i￿ s willingness to pay for the quality of the set of agents from side l to which i
is matched. The support of ui
k is some arbitrary set Uk, which can assume discrete or continuous
values on each of its dimensions. In contrast, the support of vi
k is the real interval Vk ￿ [vk;vk] ￿ R.
To avoid the uninteresting case where no agent from neither side is willing to interact with agents
from the opposite side, we assume that ￿ vk > 0 for some side k 2 fA;Bg.
6Board shows that the partition induced under pro￿t-maximization is never coarser than under welfare maximization
(note that this result, however, does not imply that it is ￿ner). By considering more general matching rules we show
that the pro￿t-maximizing rule indeed matches each agent to a subset of his e¢ cient set. On the other hand, Board
allows for more general preferences than the ones considered in this paper. Rayo (2010) considers a one-sided matching
problem where the peer e⁄ect of a group is the average valuation of its members. In contrast to Board and the present




l) denote the interaction quality that each agent i from side k obtains from being matched
to an agent j from side l with characteristics u
j
l (we call ￿k(u
j
l) the attractiveness of agent j). The
function ￿k : Ul ! R+ thus maps the characteristics of each agent j from side l to the interaction
quality enjoyed by each agent i from side k.
In the Cable TV example, let viewers belong to side A and channels to side B. In this case,
ui
A contains information about demographics, income, educational background, consumption habits,
of viewer i from side A, whereas u
j
B contains information about the shows and the advertisement
o⁄ered by channel j from side B.7 Accordingly, ￿A(u
j
B) is the quality (or attractiveness) of channel j
as perceived by viewers, whereas ￿B(ui
A) is the contribution of viewer i to the quality of the audience
enjoyed by channels. In turn, vi
A captures viewer i￿ s willingness to pay for a higher quality package
of channels, while v
j
B stands for channel j￿ s willingness to pay for an audience of higher quality (e.g.,
having audiences of higher quality allows channels to increase advertising revenues).
To accommodate the case where agent i dislikes interacting with agents from side l (negative
externalities), we allow the support of vi
k to take negative values. For example, in the context of
health care provision, let patients belong to side A and doctors to B. In this case, ui
A describes
patient i￿ s medical condition, and vi
A captures patient i￿ s willingness to pay for a better physicians￿
network. In turn, u
j
B describes doctor j￿ s skills, while v
j
B captures doctor j￿ s disutility from meeting
more patients (re￿ ecting the doctors￿opportunity cost of time). In this example, ￿A(u
j
B) is the
contribution of doctor j to the quality of a given physicians￿network, while ￿B(ui
A) captures the
intensity of care demanded by patient i.8
The quality of any set of agents from side l (as perceived by each agent from side k) is the sum of
the interaction qualities (or attractiveness) of each of its side-l members. Accordingly, for any given
(Lebesgue measurable) set of agents s from side l with type pro￿le (￿
j







the quality associated with the set s (￿(￿) is the Lebesgue measure). Importantly, all agents from
side k agree on the attractiveness of each agent j from side l, and hence on the quality of each set s,
which is what makes the model one of vertical di⁄erentiation.
Given any complete type pro￿le ￿ ￿(￿i
k)
i2[0;1]
k=A;B, the payo⁄ enjoyed by each agent i from each side
k when matched, at a price p; to a set s of agents from side l is given by
￿i
k(s;p;￿) ￿ vi
k ￿ gk (jsjk) ￿ p; (1)
7Assuming channels possess superior information than the Cable TV company about the impact of their shows and
advertisement seems reasonable.
8Clearly, from a theoretical viewpoint, expressing attractiveness as a function of a vector u
i
k of individual attributes
is redundant. This decomposition only serves the purpose of permitting us (and possibly the econometrician) to relate
the abstract notion of attractiveness to more familiar (and in principle measurable) variables such as health status and
idiosyncratic risks in the case of health care provision, or income, education and demographics, in the case of Cable
TV provision.
9where gk(￿) is a positive, strictly increasing, continuously di⁄erentiable, function such that gk(0) = 0.
Note that the parameter vi
k summarizes all the information contained in agent i￿ s type that is relevant
for agent i￿ s preferences for quality, whereas ￿l(ui
k) summarizes his attractiveness.
The following examples describe two special cases of the preference structure outlined above.
Example 1 (linear network externalities for quantity) Suppose that the utility of each agent
i from side k depends only on the total mass of agents from side l and is linear in this mass. In this
case, ￿k(￿) ￿ 1 and gk(x) = x so that ￿i
k(s;p;￿) ￿ vi
k ￿ ￿(s) ￿ p. \\
These preferences are the ones typically considered in the two-sided market literature (e.g., Rochet
and Tirole (2003, 2006), Armstrong (2006), Hagiu (2008), Ambrus and Argenziano (2009), and Weyl
(2010)).
Example 2 (supermodular match values) Let uk be a one-dimensional random variable almost
surely equal to vk, and suppose that gk(x) = x and ￿k(uk) ￿ ￿k(vk) = vk for k 2 fA;Bg. The match
between agent i from side k and agent j from side l produces a surplus of vi
k ￿ v
j







l d￿(j) ￿ p. \\
This production function appears, for example, in Damiano and Li (2007), Hoppe, Moldovanu
and Sela (2009), as well as in the assignment/search literature (e.g., Becker (1973), Lu and McAfee
(1996) and Shimer and Smith (2000)).
We assume that the type ￿i
k = (ui
k;vi
k) of each agent i from each side k is an independent draw
from the distribution Fk with support ￿k. Letting F
v;￿
k denote the joint distribution of (vk;￿l(uk)),
we then assume that F
v;￿
k is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and denote
by Fv
k the marginal distribution of F
v;￿
k with respect to vk (with density fv
k), and by F￿
k (￿jvk) the
distribution of the interaction quality ￿l(uk) conditional on vk: We will assume that the family of
functions hF￿
k (￿jvk)ivk is uniformly continuous in vk in the L1-norm.
As is standard in the mechanism design literature, we also assume that the marginal distribution
Fv
k of the willingness to pay is regular in the sense of Myerson (1981), meaning that the virtual
valuations vk ￿ [1 ￿ Fv
k(vk)]=fv
k(vk) are continuous and nondecreasing.
Matching Mechanisms
Appealing to the Revelation Principle, we focus on (deterministic) direct-revelation mechanisms,















k(￿) represents the set of agents from side l 6= k that are
matched to agent i from side k, whereas ^ pi
k(￿) denotes the payment made by agent i to the platform
(i.e., to the match maker).9
9Restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms is without loss of optimality under the assumptions in the paper.
The proof is based on arguments similar to those in Strausz (2006) and is available upon request.
10A matching rule is feasible if and only if the following reciprocity condition holds: Whenever
agent j from side B belongs to the matching set of agent i from side A, then agent i belongs to agent
j￿ s matching set. Formally:
j 2 ^ si
A(￿) , i 2 ^ s
j
B(￿): (2)
Because there is no aggregate uncertainty and because individual identities are irrelevant for
payo⁄s, without any loss of optimality, we will restrict attention to anonymous mechanisms. In
these mechanisms, the composition (i.e., the cross-sectional type distribution) of the matching set
that each agent i from each side k receives, as well as the payment by agent i; depend only on agent
i￿ s reported type as opposed to the entire collection of reports ￿ by all agents (whose distribution
coincides with F by the analog of the law of large numbers for a continuum of random variables).
Furthermore, any two agents i and i0 (from the same side) reporting the same type are matched to
the same set and are required to make the same payments.
Suppressing superscripts, an anonymous mechanism M = fsk(￿);pk(￿)gk=A;B is described by a
pair of matching rules and a pair of payment rules such that, for any ￿k 2 ￿k; pk(￿k) is the payment,
and sk(￿k) ￿ ￿l is the set of types from side l associated with all agents from side k reporting type
￿k. Note that pk(￿) maps ￿k into R, and sk(￿) maps ￿k into the Borel sigma algebra over ￿l: With
some abuse of notation, hereafter we will then denote by jsk(￿k)jk the total quality of the matching
set of each agent i from side k reporting type ￿k:
Denote by ^ ￿k(￿k;^ ￿k;M) ￿ vi
k ￿ gk(jsk(^ ￿k)jk) ￿ pk(^ ￿k) the payo⁄ that type ￿k = (uk;vk) obtains
when reporting type ^ ￿k = (^ ui
k; ^ vi
k), and by ￿k(￿k;M) ￿ ^ ￿k(￿k;￿k;M) the payo⁄ that type ￿k
obtains by reporting truthfully. A mechanism M is individually rational (IR) if ￿k(￿k;M) ￿ 0 for
all ￿k 2 ￿k, and it is incentive compatible (IC) if ￿k(￿k;M) ￿ ^ ￿k(￿k;^ ￿k;M) for all ￿k;^ ￿k 2 ￿k. A
matching rule fsk(￿)gk=A;B is implementable if there is a payment rule fpk(￿)gk=A;B such that the
mechanism M = fsk(￿);pk(￿)gk=A;B satis￿es the IR and IC constraints.10
3 Properties of Optimal Mechanisms
3.1 E¢ ciency and Pro￿t Maximization
We start by de￿ning what we mean by ￿e¢ cient￿and ￿pro￿t-maximizing￿mechanisms. Because
there is no aggregate uncertainty, for any given type pro￿le ￿, the welfare generated by the mechanism
















vk ￿ gk (jsk(uk;vk)jk)dFk(uk;vk);
10Implicit in the aforementioned speci￿cation is the assumption that the platform must charge the agents before they
observe their payo⁄. This seems a reasonable assumption in most applications of interest. Without such an assumption,
the platform could extract all surplus by using payments similar to those in CrØmer and McLean (1988) ￿see also
Mezzetti (2007).













A mechanism MW (respectively, MP) is then said to be e¢ cient (respectively, pro￿t-maximizing)
if it maximizes ￿W(M) (respectively, ￿P(M)) among all mechanisms that are individually rational,
incentive compatible, and satisfy the reciprocity condition
￿l 2 sk(￿k) ) ￿k 2 sl(￿l): (3)
Note that the reciprocity condition implies that the matching rule fsk(￿)gk=A;B can be fully described
by its side-k correspondence sk(￿):
It is standard to show that a mechanism M is individually rational and incentive compatible if
and only if the following conditions jointly hold for each side k = A;B:
(i) the quality of the matching set is nondecreasing in the willingness to pay, i.e., jsk(uk;vk)jk ￿
jsk(u0
k;v0
k)jk for any (uk;vk) and (u0
k;v0
k) such that vk ￿ v0
k;
(ii) the expected payo⁄ of any two agents with the same willingness to pay vk is the same,
irrespective of their individual characteristics uk;
(iii) the equilibrium payo⁄s ￿k((uk;vk);M) of the lowest willingness-to-pay agents is non-negative;
(iv) the pricing rule satis￿es the envelope formula
pk(uk;vk) = vk ￿ gk (jsk(uk;vk)jk) ￿
Z vk
vk
gk (jsk(uk;x)jk)dx ￿ ￿k((uk;vk);M): (4)
It is immediate to see that in any mechanism that maximizes the platform￿ s pro￿ts, the individual
rationality constraint of each agent from each side with the lowest willingness to pay must bind, i.e.,
￿k((uk;vk);M) = 0; all uk 2 Uk; k = A;B: Using the expression for payments (4), we can rewrite the
platform￿ s pro￿t maximization problem in a manner analogous to the welfare maximization problem.
We simply replace the true valuations with their virtual analogs (i.e., with the true valuations
discounted for informational rents). Formally, for any vk 2 Vk; any k = A;B; let ’W
k (vk) = vk and
’P
k (vk) = vk ￿ [1 ￿ Fv
k(vk)]=fv
k(vk). Using the superscript h = W (resp. h = P) to denote welfare







k(vk) ￿ gk (jsk(uk;vk)jk)dFk(uk;vk) (5)
among all rules that, together with the price rule given by (4) with ￿k((uk;vk);M) = 0; satisfy
constraints (i) and (ii) above and the reciprocity condition (3).
Hereafter, we will say that a matching rule fsh
k(￿)gk=A;B is h-optimal if it solves the above h-
problem. For future reference, for both h = W;P; we also de￿ne the reservation value rh
k ￿ inffvk 2
12Vk : ’h
k(vk) ￿ 0g when fvk 2 Vk : ’h
k(vk) ￿ 0g 6= ?:
3.2 Single Network vs Nested Multi-Homing
Before solving the platform￿ s welfare and pro￿t-maximization problems, we describe two important
classes of matching rules.
De￿nition 1 (single-homing) A matching rule sk(￿) exhibits single-homing if for all ￿k;￿0
k 2 ￿k,
sk(￿k) \ sk(￿0
k) 6= ￿ implies that sk(￿k) = sk(￿0
k):
Single-homing matching rules can be implemented by o⁄ering the agents access to mutually
exclusive networks and by charging appropriate fees for the di⁄erent networks. As mentioned above,
these rules are central to the two-sided markets literature. Part of the contribution of the present
analysis is to derive conditions under which such rules are optimal.
A particularly simple type of single-homing matching rule is one that employs a single network.
De￿nition 2 (single network) A matching rule sk(￿) employs a single network if for all ￿k;￿0
k 2
￿k, sk(￿k);sk(￿0
k) 6= ￿ implies that sk(￿k) = sk(￿0
k).
In contrast, under a multi-homing matching rule, the platform establishes a certain number of
non-exclusive networks and allows agents from each side to join multiple networks. Of particular
interest are nested multi-homing rules. Under these rules, if agents i1 and i2 from side k commonly
meet agent j from side l, then the matching sets of agents i1 and i2 are nested.
De￿nition 3 (nested multi-homing) A matching rule sk(￿) exhibits nested multi-homing if for all
￿k;￿0
k 2 ￿k, sk(￿k)\sk(￿0
k) 6= ￿ implies that sk(￿k) ￿ sk(￿0
k) or sk(￿k) ￿ sk(￿0
k), where the inclusion
is strict for some ￿k;￿0
k 2 ￿k.
An example of a nested multi-homing matching rule is the Cable TV application discussed above.
In this case, the provider o⁄ers (mutually non-exclusive) packages that can be added to a ￿standard
plan￿ , and which grant access to extra channels. Multi-homing matching rules are also pervasive
in online advertising (where advertisers can ￿buy￿ access to an increasing set of browsers) and
health-care provision (where patients enroll in health plans that include di⁄erent sets of doctors and
hospitals).
As anticipated in the Introduction, our ￿rst result shows that under the following two fairly
natural conditions, the optimal matching rules have a simple structure.
Condition 1 [DMU] Diminishing Marginal Utility: The function gk(￿) is (weakly) concave for all
k 2 fA;Bg.
Condition 2 [PA] Positive A¢ liation: The distribution Fk is such that (￿l(~ uk); ~ vk) are (weakly)
positively a¢ liated for all k 2 fA;Bg.11
11See Milgrom and Weber (1982) for a formal treatment of the concept of a¢ liation.
13We then have the following result.
Proposition 1 (optimal rules) Assume conditions DMU and PA hold. Then both the pro￿t-
maximizing (h = P) and the welfare-maximizing (h = W) rules discriminate only along the willingness-
to-pay dimension (that is, sh
k(vk;uk) = sh
k(vk;u0
k) for any vk;uk;u0
k; h = W;P). Suppressing the
dependence on uk; k = A;B, the h-optimal matching rule sh










k 2 [vk;vk] is the threshold below which types are excluded, and where the nonincreasing
function th
k(￿) determines the matching sets.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the result, consider an agent with type ￿k = (uk;vk) with ’h
k(vk) ￿ 0. Ignoring
for a moment the monotonicity constraints, it is easy to see that it is always optimal to assign to this
type a matching set sk(uk;vk) ￿ f(ul;vl) : ’h
l (vl) ￿ 0g that includes all types ￿l = (ul;vl) whose
’h
l -valuation is non-negative. This is because, (i) irrespective of their ul characteristics, these types
contribute positively to type ￿k￿ s payo⁄ (recall that ￿k(ul) ￿ 0 for all ul) and (ii) these types have a
non-negative ’h
l -valuation, and therefore adding type ￿k to these types￿matching sets never reduces
the platform￿ s payo⁄ ￿h(M), as implied by (5). Now imagine that the platform wants to assign to
this type ￿k a matching set sl whose intrinsic quality qk is higher than the quality of the set of types
on side l whose ’h
l -valuation is non-negative, i.e., such that





Because of reciprocity, adding an agent whose ’h
l -valuation is negative to type ￿k￿ s matching set
now comes at a cost. In the case of welfare-maximization, agents with negative valuations require a
payment to accept larger matching sets. In the case of pro￿t-maximization, this cost stems from the
infra-marginal losses on revenue captured by negative virtual valuations.
The positive a¢ liation between (￿k(ul);vl) along with the weak concavity of gk(￿) (which implies
that using the same agent as an input is less costly than using di⁄erent agents) and the limitations
imposed by the asymmetry of information, imply that the least costly way to provide type ￿k with
a matching set of quality qk is by matching him to all types ￿l whose ’h
l -valuation is the least
negative, irrespective of their ul characteristics. This means that type ￿k￿ s matching set takes the
form Ul [ [th




14Because the quality of the matching set in monotone in vk, as required by incentive compatibility,
the threshold function th
k(￿) is nonincreasing. The proof in the Appendix uses results from the theory
of monotone concave order of random variables to verify the heuristics above.
The following corollary is then a direct implication of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 (optimal network structures) Assume conditions DMU and PA hold. Then any
h-optimal matching rule either employs a single network or induces nested multi-homing, h = W;P.
All other single-homing structures are dominated.
Given the result in Proposition 1, we can restrict attention to mechanisms whose matching rule
takes the form given in (6). Letting ^ gk : Vl ! R+ denote the function de￿ned by








the platform￿ s objective then consists in choosing a pair of exclusion thresholds (!h
k)k2fA;Bg and a
pair of nonincreasing threshold functions (th











subject to the reciprocity constraint that
th
k(vk) = inffvl : th
l (vl) ￿ vkg (8)
for all vk 2 [!h
k;vk], k = A;B.
The next two results provide necessary and su¢ cient condition for the h-optimal mechanism
to employ either a single network or to exhibit nested multi-homing and characterize properties of
optimal multi-homing rules. These results are obtained by assuming that the following condition
holds, which strengthens the standard monotonicity of virtual valuations, as required in our two-sided
matching environment.
Condition 3 [SR] Strong Regularity: The functions  h












l (jUk ￿ [vk; ￿ vk]jl) ￿ E[￿l(~ uk)j~ vk = vk]
are strictly increasing, k = A;B; h = W;P:
Take the case of pro￿t-maximization, h = P. The numerator in  h
k(vk) accounts for the e⁄ect on
the platform￿ s pro￿ts of an agent from side k with valuation vk as a consumer (as his virtual valuation
’h
k(vk) is proportional to the marginal revenue produced by this agent). In turn, the denominator
accounts for the e⁄ect on the platform￿ s pro￿ts of this agent as an input (as ￿^ g0
l(vk) is proportional
15to the marginal utility brought by this agent to every agent from side l who is already matched
to any other agent with valuation above vk). The a¢ liation and concavity assumptions imply that
the denominator of  h
k(vk) is nondecreasing in vk. Therefore, the strong regularity condition above
requires that the value of an agent as a consumer (as captured by his virtual valuation) increases faster
than his contribution as an input. In the linear model,  h
k(vk) = ’h
k(vk)=E[￿l(~ uk)j~ vk = vk], which is
increasing provided that the positive a¢ liation between ￿l(uk) and vk is not ￿too strong￿ . As we will
see in Proposition 3 below, the key role played by strong regularity is to rule out nonmonotonicities
in the schedule of matching qualities. In this sense, it is the analog of Myerson standard regularity
condition in two-sided matching problems. It also plays a role in Proposition 2 below, but only in
the special case where ’h
l -valuations are always positive on one-side and both positive and negative
on the other side.
Now let 4h
k : Vk ￿ Vl ! R denote the function de￿ned by
4h
k(vk;vl) ￿ ￿^ g0
k(vl) ￿ ’h
k(vk) ￿ fv
k(vk) ￿ ^ g0
l(vk) ￿ ’h
l (vl) ￿ fv
l (vl) (9)
k;l 2 fA;Bg; l 6= k: Note that 4h
A(vA;vB) = 4h
B(vB;vA) represents the marginal e⁄ect on the
platform￿ s payo⁄ of decreasing the threshold th
A(vA) below vB, while, by reciprocity, also reducing
the threshold th
B(vB) below vA. Equivalently, ￿4h(vA;vB) represents the marginal e⁄ect of deleting
the link between vA and vB starting from a network structure where each agent from side A with
valuation vA is matched to all agents from side B with valuation above vB and each agent from
side B with valuation vB is matched to all agents from side A with valuation above vA: For future
reference, also note that sign(4h
k(vk;vl)) = sign( h
k(vk)+ h
l (vl)): We then have the following result.
Proposition 2 (single- vs multi-homing) Assume Conditions DMU, PA and SR hold. The h-
optimal matching rule employs a single (complete) network if 4h
k(vk;vl) ￿ 0 (that is, if starting from
a complete network deleting the link between vA and vB reduces the platform￿ s payo⁄ ) and exhibits
nested multi-homing otherwise, h = W;P.
Proof. Consider ￿rst the case where ’h
k(vk) ￿ 0 for k = A;B, implying that 4h
k(vk;vl) ￿ 0.
Because valuations (virtual valuations) are all nonnegative, welfare (pro￿ts) is (are) maximized by
matching each agent from each side to all agents from the other side, meaning that the optimal
matching rule employs a single network which includes all agents (i.e., a complete network).
Next, consider the case where ’h
k(vk) < 0 for k = A;B, so that 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0. Starting from
any single network the platform can then increase its payo⁄ by switching to multi-homing. To see
this, let ^ !h
k denote the threshold type corresponding to the single network so that agents from side k
are excluded if and only if vk < ^ !h




k ￿ inffvk 2 Vk : ’h
k(vk) ￿ 0g: The platform could then increase its payo⁄ by switching to a
nested multi-homing rule that assigns to each agent from side k with valuation vk ￿ ^ !h
k the same
matching set as the original matching rule while it assigns to each agent with valuation vk 2 [rh
k; ^ !h
k]
the matching set [^ v
#
l ;vl]; where ^ v
#
l ￿ maxfrh
l ; ^ !h
l g.
16Next, suppose that ^ !h
k < rh
k for both k = A;B. Starting from this single network, the platform
could then increase her payo⁄ by switching to a nested multi-homing rule s
}









l ;vl] , vk 2 [rh
k;vk]
[rh
l ;vl] , vk 2 [^ !h
k;rh
k]
￿ , vk 2 [vk; ^ !h
k]
:
The new matching rule improves upon the original one because it eliminates all matches between
agents whose valuations (virtual valuations) are both negative.
Finally, suppose that ^ !h
k = rh
k for some k 2 fA;Bg whereas ^ !h
l ￿ rh
l for l 6= k: The platform could









l ;vl] , vk 2 [rh
k;vk]
[rh








By setting the new exclusion threshold ^ !
#
k su¢ ciently close to rh
k the platform increases its payo⁄.
In fact, the marginal bene￿t of increasing the quality of the matching sets of those agents from side
l whose ’h
l -valuation is positive more than o⁄sets the marginal cost of getting on board a few more
agents from side k whose ’h
k-valuation is negative, but su¢ ciently small.13 Note that for this network
expansion to be pro￿table, it is essential that the new agents from side k that are brought ￿on board￿
be matched only to those agents from side l whose ’h
l -valuation is positive, which requires employing
a multi-homing matching rule.
In the Appendix, we complete the proof by analyzing the remaining case where ’h
l (vl) < 0 while
’h
k(vk) ￿ 0. This is the only case in which strong regularity plays a role. Q.E.D.




Corollary 2 Multi-homing matching rules are more often employed by pro￿t-maximizing platforms
than by welfare-maximizing platforms.
The ￿nding above are illustrated by the next two examples.
Example 3 Consider the case of linear network externalities, as described in Example 1 above, and
assume that valuations vk are uniformly distributed over [vk;vk]. Then, the welfare-maximizing rule
employs a single network if 4W
A (vA;vB) = vA + vB ￿ 0, and exhibits nested multi-homing other-
wise. In turn, the pro￿t-maximizing rule employs a single network if 4P
A(vA;vB) = 2(vA + vB) ￿
(vA + vB) = 4W
A (vA;vB) ￿ [(vA ￿ vA) + (vB ￿ vB)] ￿ 0, and exhibits nested multi-homing other-
wise. \\
12The behavior of the rule on side l is then pinned down by reciprocity.



















l (vl) > 0; whereas the marginal cost is given by ￿^ gk(r
h













17Example 4 Consider the case of supermodular matching values, as described in Example 2 above,
and assume that valuations vk are uniformly distributed over [vk;vk] with vk > 0. Then, the
welfare-maximizing rule employs a single network, since 4W
A (vA;vB) = 2 ￿ vA ￿ vB > 0. In turn,
the pro￿t-maximizing rule employs a single network if 4P
A(vA;vB) =
P





2 ￿ (vA=vA + vB=vB)
￿
￿ 0, and exhibits nested multi-homing otherwise. \\
3.3 Optimal Multi-Homing Rules
We now further investigate the properties of optimal matching rules when nested multi-homing is
optimal, that is, when 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0. The next de￿nition extends to our two-sided matching setting
the notion of separating schedules, as it appears in Maskin and Riley (1984).
De￿nition 4 (maximally separating rules) The h-optimal matching rule is maximally separat-
ing if th
k(￿) is strictly decreasing over [!h
k;th
l (!h
l )] (which we call the separating range). It exhibits
exclusion at the bottom on side k if !h
k > vk and bunching at the top on side k if th
l (!h
l ) < ￿ vk:
The next proposition characterizes the h-optimal matching rule under the assumption that the
strong regularity condition holds.
Proposition 3 (optimal multi-homing rules) Assume Conditions DMU, PA and SR hold and
suppose that multi-homing is optimal (i.e., 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0). The following properties are true both
for h = W and for h = P:
(i) The h-optimal matching rule is maximally separating.
(ii) If 4h
k(￿ vk;vl) > 0, there is bunching at the top on side k and no exclusion at the bottom on
side l.
(iii) If 4h
k(￿ vk;vl) < 0, there is exclusion at the bottom on side l and no bunching at the top on
of side k (In the knife-edge case where 4h
k(￿ vk;vl) = 0, there is neither bunching at the top on side k
nor exclusion at the bottom on side l).
(iv) For all valuations vk in the separating range [!h
k;th
l (!h
l )], the h-optimal threshold function
th
k(￿) satis￿es the Euler equation
4h
k(vk;th












Assume vk < 0; k = A;B: An important feature of the maximally separating h-optimal rule
described above is that th
k(vk) ￿ rh
l if and only if vk ￿ rh
k. Consider the case of pro￿t-maximization
(The arguments for the case of welfare maximization are analogous). Agents with positive virtual
valuations from side k are matched to all agents with positive virtual valuations on side l, plus a
measure of agents with negative virtual valuations from side l (cross-subsidization). The optimal
level of cross-subsidization for an agent with virtual valuation ’P
k (vk) > 0 is then determined by the




k (vk) ￿ fv
k(vk) of enlarging the matching set of an agent from side k who is already matched to all
agents from side l with valuation above tP






of enlarging the matching set of any agent from side l with valuation vl = tP
k (vk) who is already
matched to all agents from side k with valuation above vk = tP
l (vl); as required by reciprocity (recall
that ’P
l (tP
k (vk)) < 0).
Intuitively, agents from each side of the market are endogenously partitioned in two groups. Those
with positive virtual valuations (equivalently, with valuations vk ￿ rP
k ) play the role of consumers,
￿purchasing￿sets of agents from the other side of the market (these agents contribute positively to
the platform￿ s pro￿ts). In turn, those agents with a negative virtual valuation (equivalently, with
valuation vk < rP
k ) play the role of inputs, generating utility to the agents from the other side of the
market they are matched to (these agents contribute negatively to the platform￿ s pro￿ts).
It is also worth noticing that optimality implies that there is bunching at the top on side k if
and only if there is no exclusion at the bottom on side l. In other words, bunching can only occur
at the top due to binding capacity constraints, that is, when the ￿stock￿of agents from side l has
been exhausted. This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 5 Consider the environment with linear network externalities as in Examples 1 and 3.
Assume that each agent from side A has a valuation drawn from a uniform distribution on [1;3=2],
while each agent from side B has a valuation drawn from a uniform distribution on [￿1;0]. Since
4W
A (3=2;0) = 0 and 4P
A(3=2;0) = ￿3=2; the welfare-maximizing provision of matching services em-
ploys a single (complete) network, while the pro￿t-maximizing provision exhibits nested multi-homing
with the threshold function tP
A(vA) = 3=4￿vA de￿ned over [1;3=2]. Under pro￿t-maximization, there
is bunching at the top on side B and exclusion at the bottom on side B, as illustrated in Figure 1.\\
The example above o⁄ers a stylized description of the market for health care services. The
platform here is a health insurance company providing patients from side A access to physicians
from side B. The physicians￿negative valuations re￿ ect their opportunity cost of treating additional
patients. The welfare-maximizing (say, public) provision of health insurance adopts a single (com-
plete) network where all patients have access to all doctors. In contrast, the pro￿t-maximizing (say,
private) provision of health insurance exhibits a nested multi-homing matching rule according to
which patients and doctors are sorted into di⁄erent nested network plans. Those physicians with a
low opportunity cost are included in all plans, while the more expensive ones are included only in
the plans o⁄ered to those patients with the highest willingness to pay for larger physician networks.
The most expensive doctors are excluded from all plans.
Relative to what is e¢ cient, the pro￿t-maximizing matching rule thus (i) completely excludes
more agents from the market, and (ii) provides to each agent who is not excluded a matching set that
is a strict subset of his e¢ cient set. As we show below, these two distortions are general properties
19of pro￿t-maximizing matching mechanisms.
3.4 Distortions Relative to E¢ ciency: Exclusion and Isolation E⁄ects
Relative to welfare maximization, pro￿t-maximization leads to two distortions, as explained in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 (distortions) Assume Conditions DMU, PA, and SR hold. Relative to the welfare-
maximizing matching rule, the pro￿t-maximizing matching rule:
1. completely excludes a larger group of agents (exclusion e⁄ect) ￿ i.e., !P
k ￿ !W
k for k = A;B;
2. matches each agent from each side of the market to a subset of his e¢ cient matching set
(isolation e⁄ect) ￿ i.e., sP
k (vk) ￿ sW
k (vk) for all vk ￿ !P
k ; k = A;B:
Proof. See Online Supplementary Material.
The intuition for both e⁄ects can be seen from the Euler condition (10): Under pro￿t-maximization,
the platform only internalizes the cross-e⁄ects on marginal revenues (which are proportional to vir-
tual valuations ’P
k (vk)), rather than the cross-e⁄ects on welfare (which are proportional to the true
valuations vk). Since virtual valuations are always smaller than the true valuations, the platform fails
to internalize part of the marginal welfare gains from new matches. As explained in the Introduction,
this leads to smaller matching sets potentially for all types (including the highest types on each side
of the market) and to exclusion of a larger group of agents.
The next example illustrates the exclusion and isolation e⁄ects in the context of the supermodular
matching value case of Example 2.
Example 6 Consider the environment with supermodular matching values, as in Examples 2 and 4.
Each agent from each side has a valuation drawn from a uniform distribution on [v;v], where v > 0
and 2v < ￿ v. Since 4W
k (v;v) = 2v2 and 4P
k (v;v) = 2v(2v ￿ ￿ v) < 0, the welfare-maximizing provision
of matching services entails the creation of a single complete network, while the pro￿t-maximizing




4￿vk￿￿ v de￿ned over (!k; ￿ v) = (￿ v
3; ￿ v). Under pro￿t-maximization, there is exclusion at the
bottom on both sides and each agent who is not excluded is matched to a strict subset of his e¢ ciency
set. Figure 2 describes the pro￿t-maximizing solution when [v;v] = [1;6]. \\
This example o⁄ers a stylized description of a market where the platform is an employment
agency that matches free-lancers on side A to ￿rms on side B. The output of the match between
each free-lancer and each ￿rm is increasing in the quality/productivity of the two parties and is
evenly split between the ￿rm and the free-lancer. In this environment, a welfare-maximizing (say,
public) employment agency creates a single (complete) network that gives each free-lancer access to
all ￿rms. In contrast, a pro￿t-maximizing (say, private) agency o⁄ers a menu of access plans to each
side which results in fewer matches and more exclusion on both sides.
203.5 Implications for Prices
The analysis so far restricted attention to direct-revelation mechanisms, where the matching set and
the payment of each agent depend on the reported type. While these mechanisms help us describe
the allocations that are induced both under welfare and under pro￿t maximization, in reality these
allocations are typically obtained by letting agents choose from a menu. For example, in the case of
health care provision, patients are typically o⁄ered menus of health plans where the price for each
plan depends on the number of doctors included in the plan. Accordingly, we will now show how
the characterization from Proposition 3 translates into properties of price schedules that indirectly
implement the optimal mechanism Mh.
In order to express the optimal pricing formulas in terms of observable variables, in this subsection
we will restrict attention to the case where agents care only about the total number of agents from
the other side that they are matched to (that is, ￿k(￿) ￿ 1 for k 2 fA;Bg). For any qk 2 [0;1]; then
let ￿h
k(qk) denote the total price that agents from side k have to pay for a matching set of size qk
under the h-optimal mechanism Mh. Accordingly, the tari⁄ ￿h
k(￿) has to satisfy ￿h
k(qk) = ph
k(uk;vk)
for all (uk;vk) such that jsh
k(vk)jk = qk.
At any point of di⁄erentiability of the tari⁄ ￿h
k(￿), we will then denote by
d￿h
k
dqk (qk) the marginal
price for the qk unit. Now, given the tari⁄ ￿h
k(￿), let
xh
k(vk) 2 arg max
qk2[0;1]
vk ￿ gk(qk) ￿ ￿h
k(qk)
denote the individual demand of each agent from side k with marginal willingness to pay vk: At any
point xh
k(vk) of di⁄erentiability of the tari⁄ ￿h









Given the monotonicity of the individual demand in vk, the side-k aggregate demand for the qk unit
at the marginal price
d￿h
k




















Given the expression for aggregate demand above, we can compute the elasticity of the aggregate
















































14This is the measure of agents whose matching set is of size greater or equal than qk.
21As usual, this elasticity measures the responsiveness of the aggregate demand for the qk unit to
variations of the marginal price of the qk unit. The elasticity is positive (in the sense that an increase










￿￿1 (qk)) and negative for all agents with negative valuations vk < 0. For example,
in the health care application where valuations are negative on the doctors￿side, a negative elasticity
re￿ ects the idea that if marginal payments to doctors increase, then the doctors respond by accepting
more patients.
The next proposition recasts the ￿rst-order Euler condition (10) in terms of demand elasticities
and marginal prices. The expression below extends to matching markets the familiar Lerner-Wilson
formula for second-degree price discrimination in commodity markets (see Wilson (1997)).
Proposition 5 (Lerner-Wilson formula for matching markets) In addition to Conditions
DMU and SR, suppose that network e⁄ects depend only on quantities (￿k(￿) ￿ 1 for k 2 fA;Bg),
and that multi-homing is optimal (i.e., 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0). Then the optimal price schedules ￿h
k(￿);￿h
l (￿)
































































where the indicator function 1h equals one in case of pro￿t-maximization (h = P) and zero in case







is the aggregate demand for the qk
unit on side k at marginal price d￿h
k(qk)=dqk:
Proof. See Appendix.
First, consider welfare maximization. The result then says that the marginal price for the qk















is the aggregate demand for the qk agent on side k: In the health care
application, this means that the marginal price that the platform charges to any patient who wants
to add an additional doctor to a plan of size qk is equal to the marginal payment that the platform








Next consider pro￿t-maximization. Take a matching set of size qk sold to an agent from side k
that plays the role of a consumer (i.e., for whom marginal revenue is positive, that is, vk > rP
k ). The






22for optimal monopoly pricing. It equalizes the marginal revenue of expanding the matching set on
side k (the left hand side) to the marginal cost of ￿procuring￿extra agents from side l (the right
hand side). As in standard monopoly pricing, at the optimum, the marginal price d￿P
k (qk)=dqk for
any quantity qk sold to agents who play the role of consumers is set so that the aggregate demand














> 1, as can be seen from (11) and (12) after
plugging vk > rP
k .
The interesting part of the formula is the expression for the endogenous marginal cost of expanding
a matching set of size qk. This is the cost of procuring an additional agent from the opposite side.
As shown in Proposition 3, this cost is minimized by picking an agent from side l whose matching











￿￿1 (qk) denote the
valuation of the marginal agent from side k who is induced to purchase a matching set of size qk:








: The marginal cost of expanding the matching set of this agent under the
optimal matching rule is thus equal to the cost of adding this agent to the matching set of an agent







whose matching set contains all agents from side























dqk : This means that the marginal cost of expanding a matching set of size qk on side k is












that the platform pays on side l to those agents








































that re￿ ects the monopsonistic role that the platform plays on side l under the impossibility of perfect
(￿rst degree) price discrimination.
Turning to the shape of the price schedules (and the existence of quantity discounts/premiums),
note that, in the case of linear network externalities for quantities (gk(x) ￿ x), the ￿rst-order
condition (11) implies that marginal prices increase with quantities, meaning that the price schedule
￿h
k(￿) is a convex function of qk. In other words, the platform charges a quantity premium to those
agents who play the role of consumers for expanding the size of their matching sets. In the case
of strictly diminishing marginal utility for match quality (gk(￿) strictly concave), the emergence of
quantity discounts depends nontrivially on the interplay between the elasticities of demands on both
sides. In general there does not appear to be a good reason to expect price schedules to exhibit
quantity discounts for the full range of quantities sold.
Lastly, note that the Lerner-Wilson formula (13) only depends on the shape of the aggregate
demand for matching services on the two sides of the market. It can be used for a structural
23estimate of the demand for matching services. It also provides testable implications about the e⁄ects
of changes in elasticity on total and marginal prices. As an illustration, suppose that network e⁄ects
are linear (i.e., gA(x) = gB(x) = x) and that the demand from side k becomes less elastic, meaning
that the new distribution ~ Fv
k dominates the old distribution Fv
k in the hazard-rate order, while,
for any vk; ~ F￿
k (￿jvk) = F￿
k (￿jvk).15 The platform￿ s pro￿t-maximizing response to such a shock is to
reduce the matching sets of each agent from side k (with an unambiguous negative e⁄ect on payo⁄s).
In turn, this is accomplished by increasing the total price for each size qk of the matching set. One
can then use the result in the preceding proposition to verify that marginal prices also go up (see
Proposition A1 and Corollary A1 in the Supplementary Material for details). As for the e⁄ects of
such shocks on the opposite side, these e⁄ects are in general ambiguous. On the one hand, by virtue
of reciprocity, the matching sets of agents from side l also shrink. On the other hand, because of
the positive a¢ liation assumption, agents from side k are on average more attractive. The reason is
that, although the conditional distributions are held constant, more agents on side k exhibit higher
valuations (recall that if ~ Fv
k dominates Fv
k in the hazard-rate order then it also does it in the usual
￿rst-order sense). Clearly, agents from side l are worse o⁄ in the special case where network e⁄ects
depend only on quantities (i.e., ￿l(￿) ￿ 1).
The next subsection provides further empirically testable predictions by studying the (less ex-
plored) cross-side e⁄ects of changes in attractiveness.
3.6 The Detrimental E⁄ects of Becoming More Attractive
Shocks that alter the cross-side e⁄ects of matches are common in two-sided markets. Changes in the
income distribution of households, for example, a⁄ect the pricing strategies of Cable TV providers,
since channels￿pro￿ts change for the same population of viewers (e.g., because advertisers are willing
to pay more for viewers with higher purchasing power).
The next de￿nition formalizes the notion of a change in attractiveness.
De￿nition 5 (higher attractiveness) Side k is more attractive under the distribution Fk than un-
der the distribution ^ Fk if, for all vk, F￿
k (￿jvk) dominates ^ F￿
k (￿jvk) in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic
dominance, and Fv
k = ^ Fv
k.
The next proposition describes how the pro￿t-maximizing matching rule changes as side k be-
comes more attractive (a similar analysis holds for the case of welfare-maximization). Perhaps
surprisingly, agents from side k can be hurt by a positive shock to their attractiveness.
Proposition 6 (increase in attractiveness) In addition to Conditions PA and SR, suppose
that network e⁄ects are linear (i.e., gA(x) = gB(x) = x), and that multi-homing is optimal (i.e.,
4P
k (vk;vl) < 0). If the attractiveness of side k increases, then the platform switches from a match-
ing rule sP
k (￿) to a matching rule ^ sP
k (￿) such that:












k (vk) for all vk 2 Vk.
241. the matching sets on side k increase for low-valuation agents and decrease for high-valuation
ones ￿ ^ sP
k (vk) ￿ sP
k (vk) if and only if vk ￿ rP
k ;
2. low-valuations agents from side k are better o⁄, whereas the opposite is true for high-valuation
ones ￿ there exists ^ ￿k 2 (rP
k ; ￿ vk] such that ￿k(￿k; ^ MP) ￿ ￿k(￿k;MP) if and only if vk ￿ ^ ￿k.
Proof. See Online Supplementary Material.
Intuitively, an increase in the attractiveness of side k alters the costs of cross-subsidization between
sides. Agents with valuation vk ￿ rP
k are valued by the platform mainly by their role as consumers.
As these agents become more attractive, the costs of cross-subsidizing their ￿consumption￿using
agents from side l with negative virtual valuations increases, whereas the revenue gain on side k is
unaltered. As a consequence, the matching sets of these agents shrink. The opposite is true for those
agents with valuation vk ￿ rP
k ￿ these agents are valued by the platform mainly by their role as
inputs. As they become better inputs, their matching sets expand.





jsk(~ vk)jk d~ vk ￿
Z vk
vk
j^ sk(~ vk)jk d~ vk = ￿k(￿k; ^ MP);
meaning that all agents from side k with vk ￿ rP
k are necessarily better o⁄. On the other hand, since
j^ sk(vk)jk ￿ jsk(vk)jk for all vk ￿ rP
k , then either payo⁄s increase for all agents on side k, or there
exists a threshold type ^ ￿k > rP
k such that the payo⁄ of each agent from side k is higher under the
new rule than under the original one if and only if vk ￿ ^ vk.
Next, consider the e⁄ect of the increase in attractiveness on side k on the payo⁄s of agents from
side l: On the one hand, the fact that side k becomes more attractive implies that the payo⁄ that
each agent from side l derives from interacting with side k increases: On the other hand, by virtue
of reciprocity, the matching sets for all agents with valuation vl < rP
l shrink, which contributes
negatively to pro￿ts. The net e⁄ect on the payo⁄s of agents from side l can thus be ambiguous and
nonmonotone in vl. Still, using equation (4), one can show that if there exists a type ^ ￿l ￿ rP
l who is
better o⁄, then necessarily the same is true for all types vl > ^ ￿l.
The results from Proposition 6 o⁄er testable predictions about the pricing strategies of many
two-sided platforms. In the case of Cable TV providers, it implies that shocks to households￿income
or wealth (which do not a⁄ect their valuation for channels) shall be accompanied by improvements
on the standard packages and worsening of the premium packages o⁄ered by the platform.
Consider the pro￿t-maximizing price schedule ￿P
k (￿) de￿ned in Subsection 3.4. The next corollary
translates Proposition 6 in terms of the tari⁄ ￿P
k (￿).
Corollary 3 (e⁄ect of attractiveness on prices) In addition to Conditions PA and SR, suppose
that network e⁄ects are linear (i.e., gA(x) = gB(x) = x), and that multi-homing is optimal (i.e.,
4P
k (vk;vl) < 0). If the attractiveness of side k increases, then the platform moves from a price
25schedule ￿P
k (￿) to a price schedule ^ ￿P
k (￿) such that ^ ￿P
k (qk) ￿ ￿P












Proof. See Online Supplementary Material.
In terms of price schedules, an increase in the attractiveness of side k increases the prices that
agents on side k have to pay for high quality matching sets, and decreases the price for low quality
matching sets.
4 Extensions and Conclusions
The analysis developed above is worth extending in a number of interesting directions. Below we ￿rst
discuss how the results can accommodate a few simple enrichments and then conclude by discussing
various lines for future research.
Insulating Tari⁄s and Robust Implementation. In the direct revelation version of the
matching game described above, each agent from each side is asked to submit a report ￿k which leads
to a payment ph
k(￿k), as de￿ned in (4), and which grants access to all agents from the opposite side
who reported valuations above th
k(vk). This game admits one Bayes-Nash equilibrium implementing
the matching rule sh
k(￿), together with other equilibria implementing di⁄erent rules.16
As pointed out by Weyl (2010) (see also White and Weyl (2010)) in the context of a monopolistic
platform designing a single network, equilibrium uniqueness can however be guaranteed when network
e⁄ects depend only on quantities (i.e., when ￿k(￿) ￿ 1 for k 2 fA;Bg): In the context of our model,
it su¢ ces to replace the payment rule (ph




l )j2[0;1]) = vk ￿ gk
￿￿ ￿












￿ ￿fj 2 [0;1] : v
j



















l ￿tk(vk)g d￿(j) denotes the measure of agents reporting a
valuation above tk(vk): Given the above payment rule, it is weakly dominant for each agent to report
truthfully (This follows from the fact that, given any pro￿le of reports (v
j
l )i2[0;1] by all agents from
the other side, the quality of the matching set for each agent from side k = A;B is increasing in
his report, along with the fact that the payment rule %h
k(￿;(v
j
l )j2[0;1]) satis￿es the familiar envelope
formula with respect to vk). In the spirit of the Wilson doctrine, this also means that the the optimal
allocation rule can be robustly (fully) implemented in weakly undominated strategies.17
16In the implementation literature, this problem is referred to as ￿partial implementation￿ , whereas in the two-sided
market literature as the ￿chicken and egg￿problem (e.g., Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003)) or the ￿failure to launch￿
problem (e.g., Evans and Schmalensee (2009)). See also Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and Ambrus and Argenziano
(2009).
17With more general preferences, it is still possible to robustly (fully) implement any monotone matching
rule in weakly undominated strategies by replacing the de￿nition of
￿





k in (14) with ￿









l ￿tk(vk)g ￿k;￿(j); where ￿k ￿ minf￿k(ul) : ul 2 Ulg:However, these payments
generate less revenue than the ones given in (4).
26Coarse Matching. In reality, platforms typically o⁄er menus with ￿nitely many alternatives.
As pointed out by McAfee (2002) and Hoppe, Moldovanu and Ozdenoren (2010), the reason for such
coarse matching is that platforms may face costs for adding more alternatives to their menus.18
It is easy to see that the analysis developed in this paper extends to a setting where the platform
can include no more than N alternatives in the menus o⁄ered to each side. Furthermore, as the
number of alternatives increases (e.g., because menu costs decrease), the solution to the platform￿ s
problem uniformly converges to the h-optimal nested multi-homing rule identi￿ed in the paper (This
follows from the fact that any weakly decreasing threshold function tk(￿) can be approximated ar-
bitrarily well by a step function in the sup-norm, i.e., in the norm of uniform convergence). In other
words, the maximally-separating nested multi-homing rules of Proposition 3 are the limit as N grows
large of those o⁄ered when the number of non-exclusive networks is ￿nite.
Quasi-Fixed Costs. Integrating an agent into a network structure typically involves a quasi-
￿xed cost. In the Cable TV example, a household must be connected to the underground cable
system to get access to the Cable Company channels. Similarly, in the case of job matching services,
￿rms and workers must incur the cost of setting up online pro￿les and building professional portfolios.
From the perspective of the platform, these costs are quasi-￿xed, in the sense that they depend on
whether a given agent is included in some network, but not on the agent￿ s matching set.
The analysis developed above can easily incorporate such costs. Let ck denote the quasi-￿xed
cost that the platform must incur for each agent from side k whose matching set is non empty. The
h-optimal mechanism can then be obtained by the following two-step procedure:
Step 1 Ignore quasi-￿xed costs and maximize (7) among all weakly decreasing threshold functions
th
k(￿):
Step 2 Given the optimal threshold function th
k(￿) from Step 1, choose the h-optimal exclusion types
!h
A;!h














As the quasi-￿xed costs increase, so do the exclusion types !h
k(cA;cB); k = A;B. For ck su¢ -
ciently high, the exclusion types reach the reservation values rh
k, in which case the platform switches
from multi-homing to a single network. Therefore, another testable prediction that the model deliv-
ers is that, ceteris paribus, single networks should be more prevalent in matching markets with high
quasi-￿xed costs, while nested multi-homing in markets with low quasi-￿xed costs.
The Group Design Problem. Consider the problem of how to assign agents to di⁄erent
groups in the presence of peer e⁄ects, which is central to the theory of organizations and personnel
economics. As anticipated in the Introduction, such one-sided matching problem is a special case
18See also Wilson (1989).
27of the two-sided matching problems studied in this paper. To see this, note that the problem of
designing non-exclusive groups in a one-sided matching setting is mathematically equivalent to the
problem of designing an optimal matching rule in a two-sided matching setting where (i) preferences
and type distributions of sides A and B coincide, and (ii) the matching rule is required to be
symmetric across sides, i.e., tA(v) = tB(v) all v 2 VA = VB: Under this new constraint, maximizing
(7) is equivalent to maximizing twice the objective associated with the one-sided matching problem.
As it turns out, the symmetry constraint is never binding in a two-sided matching market where the
two sides are perfectly symmetric. This is immediate when 4h
k(vk;vl) ￿ 0, that is, when a single
complete network is h-optimal. Under nested-multi-homing, 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0, the characterization
from Proposition 3 reveals that, at any point where tk(￿) is strictly decreasing, because  h




















l (v): Similarly, it is easy to see that the symmetry
condition is satis￿ed also when the optimal rule exhibits bunching at the top. As a consequence, one
can reinterpret all our results in terms of the group design problem.
We now discuss lines of future research.
Same-side Externalities. The analysis developed above assumed that the utility/pro￿t that
each agent derives from any given matching set is independent of who else from the same side has
access to the same set. In other words, we abstracted from ￿same-side￿externalities. In advertising
markets, for example, reaching a certain set of households is more pro￿table if competitors are
precluded from reaching the same set. Similar congestion e⁄ects are present in other matching
markets. Extending the analysis in this direction is promising and likely to introduce novel e⁄ects
that complement those documented in the present paper.
Di⁄erent-sign Externalities. Our analysis also assumed that each agent either bene￿ts or
su⁄ers from being matched to the other side of the market (the intensity varying with the particular
agents he/she is matched to). Allowing the same agent to derive positive utility from interacting
with certain agents and negative utility from interacting with others is also likely to deliver new
insights.
Horizontal Di⁄erentiation. The model considered in the present paper is one of pure vertical
di⁄erentiation. While this was useful to isolate important e⁄ects, many applications of interest
feature both vertical and horizontal di⁄erentiation. Extending the analysis to incorporate elements
of horizontal di⁄erentiation is challenging but highly promising.
Platform Competition. Matching markets are often populated by competing platforms. Un-
derstanding to what extent the distortions identi￿ed in the present paper are a⁄ected by the degree
of market competition and studying policy interventions (subsidies/taxes and in some cases the im-
position of universal service obligations) aimed at boosting welfare by inducing platforms to get more
agents ￿on board￿is another important direction of future research.19
19Damiano and Li (2008) consider a model in which two matchmakers compete through entry fees on two sides.
However, they restrict the analysis to one-to-one matching thus abstracting from many of the e⁄ects identi￿ed in the
present paper.
28While we do expect the above extensions to open the door to novel e⁄ects, we also expect the
key insights identi￿ed in the present paper to remain valid also in these richer settings.20
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If ’h
k(vk) ￿ 0 for k = A;B, then it is immediate from (5) that h-optimality
requires that each agent from each side be matched to all agents from the other side, in which case
sh
k(￿k) = ￿l for all ￿k 2 ￿k. This rule trivially satis￿es the threshold structure described in (6).
Thus consider the situation where ’h
k(vk) < 0 for some k 2 fA;Bg. De￿ne ￿+
k ￿ f￿k =
(uk;vk) : ’h
k(vk) ￿ 0g the set of types ￿k = (uk;vk) whose ’h
k-valuation is non-negative, and
￿￿
k ￿ f￿k = (uk;vk) : ’h
k(vk) < 0g the set of types with strictly negative ’h
k-valuation.
Let s0
k(￿) be any implementable matching rule. We will show that, starting from s0
k(￿), one can
construct another implementable matching rule ^ sk(￿) that satis￿es the threshold structure described
in (6) and that weakly increases the platform￿ s objective ￿h(M).
In order to do so, for each ￿k 2 ￿+








k, then let ^ tk(vk) be such that












k = j￿ljk, then ^ tk(vk) = vl.







k < j￿ljk (in which case rh
l 2 (vl; ￿ vl)), where rh
l is implicitly de￿ned by
’h
l (rh
l ) = 0; then let ^ tk(vk) = rh
l .
Now apply the construction above to k = A;B and consider the matching rule ^ sk(￿) such that
^ sk(￿k) =
(
Ul ￿ [^ tk(vk); ￿ vl] , ￿k 2 ￿+
k
f(ul;vl) 2 ￿+
l : ^ tl(vl) ￿ vkg , ￿k 2 ￿￿
k :
By construction,^ sk(￿)k is monotone and hence implementable. Moreover, gk (j^ sk(￿k)jk) ￿ gk (js0
k(￿k)jk)
for all ￿k 2 ￿+



















20For example, we expect competition to reduce the amount of surplus captured by the platforms but not necessarily
the distortions in the provision of the matching services identi￿ed in the present paper. Indeed, as indicated in the
literature on competition in nonlinear prices, distortions may be even larger under (imperfect) competition than in the
monopolist case. Furthermore, when contract o⁄ers are allowed to depend on the o⁄ers made by the competitors (aka
￿meet the competition clause￿ ), it is often possible to sustain the monopolist outcome as a non-cooperative equilibrium,
which suggests that the results in the present paper are likely to remain relevant also for the case of competing platforms.
29The rest of the proof shows that the matching rule ^ sk(￿) reduces the costs of cross-subsidization,
that is, the costs of serving agents with negative ’h




















k(vk) ￿ gk (j^ sk(uk;vk)jk)dFk(uk;vk): (16)
To establish (16), we start with the following result.
Lemma 1 A mechanism M is incentive compatible only if, with the exception of a countable subset
of Vk, jsk(uk;vk)jk = jsk(u0
k;vk)jk for all uk;u0
k 2 Uk; k = A;B:
Proof of Lemma 1. To see this, note that incentive compatibility requires that jsk(uk;vk)jk ￿
jsk(u0
k;v0
k)jk for any (uk;vk) and (u0
k;v0
k) such that vk ￿ v0
k. This in turn implies that E[jsk(~ uk;vk)jk]
must be nondecreasing in vk; where the expectation is with respect to ~ uk given vk. Now at any
point vk 2 Vk at which jsk(uk;vk)jk depends on uk, the expectation E[jsk(~ uk;vk)jk] is necessarily
discontinuous in vk. Because monotone functions can be discontinuous at most over a countable set
of points, this means that the quality of the matching set may vary with the characteristics uk only
over a countable subset of Vk. Q.E.D.
The next lemma introduces a property for arbitrary random variables that we will use below to
establish the result.
De￿nition 6 [monotone concave order] Let F be a probability measure on the interval [a;b] and
z1;z2 : [a;b] ! R be two random variables de￿ned over [a;b]: We say that z2 is smaller than z1 in the
monotone concave order if E[g (z2(~ !))] ￿ E[g (z1(~ !))] for all weakly concave and weakly increasing
functions g : R ! R.
Lemma 2 Suppose z1;z2 : [a;b] ! R+ are nondecreasing. If z2 is smaller than z1 in the monotone
concave order, then for any weakly concave and weakly increasing function g : R ! R and any weakly
negative and weakly increasing function h : [a;b] ! R￿, E[h(~ !)g (z1(~ !))] ￿ E[h(~ !)g (z2(~ !))]:
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof argues that the inequality above is true for any weakly increasing
step function hn : [a;b] ! R￿, where n is the number of steps. Because the set of weakly increasing
step functions is dense (in the topology of uniform convergence) in the set of weakly increasing
functions, the result follows. Because z2 is smaller than z1 in the monotone concave order, the
inequality above is obviously true for the one-step function h1. Induction shows that this is true for
all n 2 N. Q.E.D.
We then have the following result.
Lemma 3 Consider the two random variables z1;z2 : [vk;rh
k] ! R+ given by z1(vk) ￿ E~ uk [js0
k(~ uk;vk)jk jvk]
and z2(vk) ￿ E~ uk [j^ sk(~ uk;vk)jk jvk], where the distribution over [vk;rh




Then z2 is smaller than z1 in the monotone concave order.
30Proof of Lemma 3. From (i) the construction of ^ sk(￿), (ii) the assumption of positive a¢ liation
between attractiveness and willingness to pay, (iii) the fact that the measure Fv
k(vk) is absolute































k];::: the collection of T (where T 2 N [ f1g) intervals in which








k(vk), it is clear that T ￿ [T￿1
t=0 [_ v2t+1
k ; _ v2t+2
k ]
is a proper subset of [vk;rh
k] whenever the inequality is strict. Now construct _ z2(￿) on the domain
[vk;rh
k] so that:
1. _ z2(vk) = z1(vk) < z2(vk) for all vk 2 T ;





k]nT f_ z2(vk) ￿ z2(vk)gdFv
k(vk) =
R










k(vk), there always exists some ￿ 2 [0;1] such that 2





































where the ￿rst inequality follows from the weak concavity of g(￿) along with (18), while the second
inequality follows from the fact that _ z2(vk) ￿ z1(vk) for all vk 2 [vk;rh
k] and g(￿) is weakly increasing.
Q.E.D.































































k(vk) ￿ gk (j^ sk(~ uk;vk)jk)dFk(uk;vk):
The ￿rst equality follows from changing the order of integration. The second equality follows from the
fact that, since s0
k(￿) is implementable, gk (js0
k(uk;vk)jk) is invariant in uk except over a countable
subset of [vk;rh
k], as shown in Lemma 1. The ￿rst inequality follows from Lemma 2. The equality
in the ￿fth line follows again from the fact that, by construction, ^ sk(￿) is implementable, and hence
invariant in uk except in a countable subset of [vk;rh
k]. The series of equalities and inequalities above
establishes (16), as we wanted to show.
Summing up (15) and (16) shows that the platform￿ s objective is weakly greater under ^ sk(￿) than
under s0
k(￿), thus proving the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 (case ’h
l (vl) < 0 ￿ ’h
k(vk)). We show that a single network is optimal
if and only if 4h
k(vk;vl) ￿ 0, whereas nested multi-homing is optimal if and only if 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0.
First, suppose that 4h
k(vk;vl) ￿ 0 and that the matching rule is multi-homing. Take an arbitrary
point vk 2 [vk; ￿ vk] at which the function th
k(￿) is strictly decreasing in a right neighborhood of vk.
Consider the e⁄ect of a marginal reduction in the threshold th
k(vk) around the point vl = th
k(vk): This is
given by 4h
k(vk;vl). Next note that, given any interval [v0
k;v00
k] over which the function th
k(￿) is constant









k(vk;vl)]dvk. Lastly note that signf￿h
k(vk;vl)g = signf h
k(vk) +  h
l (vl)g. Under the
SR condition, this means that 4h
k(vk;vl) > 0 for all (vk;vl): The results above then imply that the
platform can increase its objective by decreasing the threshold for any type for which th
k(vk) > vl,
proving that a single complete network is optimal.
Next, suppose that 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0 and that the platform uses a single network. First suppose
that such a network is complete (that is, ^ !h
l = vl or, equivalently, th
k(vk) = vl). The fact that
4h
k(vk;vl) < 0 implies that the marginal e⁄ect of raising the threshold th
k(vk) for the lowest type on
side k, while leaving the threshold untouched for all other types is positive. By continuity of the
marginal e⁄ects, the platform can then improve its objective by switching to a multi-homing rule
that is obtained from the complete network by increasing th
k(￿) in a right neighborhood of vk while
32leaving th
k(￿) untouched elsewhere, contradicting the optimality of a single network.
Next consider the case where the single network is incomplete. From the same arguments as in
the main text, for such a network to be optimal, it must be that ^ !h
l < rh
l and ^ !h
k = vk; with ^ !h
l
satisfying the following ￿rst-order condition
^ gl(vk)’h
l (^ !h








This condition requires that the total e⁄ect of a marginal increase of the size of the network on side
l (obtained by reducing the threshold th
k(vk) below ^ !h




l )]dvk = 0. Because signf￿h
k(vk; ^ !h
l )g = signf h
k(vk) +  h
l (^ !h
l )g, under Condition SR
this means that there exists a v
#







l )dvk > 0. This means that there
exists a !
#
l < ^ !h











l ;vl] , vk 2 [vk;v
#
k ];
We conclude that multi-homing is optimal when 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using the result in Proposition 1, the h-optimal matching rule solves







^ gk(tk(vk)) ￿ ’h
k(vk) ￿ dFv
k(vk) (19)
subject to the following constraints for k;l 2 fA;Bg; l 6= k
tk(vk) = inffvl : tl(vl) ￿ vkg; (20)
tk(￿) weakly decreasing, (21)
and tk(￿) : [!k;vk] ! [!l;vl] (22)
with !k 2 [vk; ￿ vk] and !l 2 [vl; ￿ vl]. Constraint (20) is the reciprocity condition, rewritten using
the result in Proposition 1. Constraint (21) is the monotonicity constraint required by incentive
compatibility. Finally, constraint (22) is a domain-codomain restriction which requires the function
tk(￿) to map each type on side k that is included in the network into the set of types on side l that
is also included in the network.
Because 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0 (i.e., because multi-homing is optimal), it must be that rh
k > vk for
some k 2 fA;Bg. Furthermore, from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 2, at the optimum,
!h
k 2 [vk;rh
k]. In addition, whenever rh
l > vl, !h
l 2 [vl;rh
l ] and th
k(rh
k) = rh
l : Hereafter, we will assume
that rh
l > vl. When this is not the case, then !h
l = vl and th




k(vk) for vk < rh
k are obtained from the solution to program PF




k(vk) < 0 for k = A;B. Program PF can then be decomposed into the following
two independent programs PF













^ gl(tl(vl)) ￿ ’h
l (vl) ￿ dFv
l (vl) (23)
subject to tk(￿) and tl(￿) satisfying the reciprocity and monotonicity constraints (20) and (21), along
with the following constraints:
tk(￿) : [!k;rh
k] ! [rh
l ;vl]; tl(￿) : [rh
l ;vl] ! [!k;rh
k]: (24)
Program PF
k is not a standard calculus of variations problem. As an intermediate step, we will
thus consider the following Auxiliary Program (PAu
k ), which strengthens constraint (21) and ￿xes













^ gl(tl(vl)) ￿ ’h
l (vl) ￿ dFv
l (vl) (25)
subject to (20),
tk(￿);tl(￿) strictly decreasing, (26)
and tk(￿) : [vk;rh
k] ! [rh
l ;vl]; tl(￿) : [rh
l ;vl] ! [vk;rh
k] are bijections. (27)
By virtue of (26), (20) can be rewritten as tk(vk) = t￿1












k (vl)) ￿ ’h
l (vl) ￿ fv
l (vl)dvl: (28)
Changing the variable of integration in the second integral in (28) to ~ vl ￿ t￿1
k (vl), using the fact
that tk(￿) is strictly decreasing and hence di⁄erentiable almost everywhere, and using the fact that
t￿1
k (rh
l ) = rh
k and t￿1








^ gk(tk(vk)) ￿ ’h
k(vk) ￿ fv
k(vk) ￿ ^ gl(vk) ￿ ’h
l (tk(vk)) ￿ fv






subject to tk(￿) being continuous, strictly decreasing, and satisfying the boundary conditions
tk(vk) = vl and tk(rh
k) = rh
l : (30)
Consider now the Relaxed Auxiliary Program (PR
k ) that is obtained from PAu
k by dispensing with
34the condition that tk(￿) be continuous and strictly decreasing and instead allowing for any measurable
control tk(￿) : [vk;rh
k] ! [rh
l ;vl] with bounded subdi⁄erential that satis￿es the boundary condition
(30).
Lemma 4 PR
k admits a piece-wise absolutely continuous maximizer ~ tk(￿).
Proof of Lemma 4. Program PR









^ gk(x(vk)) ￿ ’h
k(vk) ￿ fv
k(vk) ￿ ^ gl(vk) ￿ ’h
l (x(vk)) ￿ fv




x0(vk) = y(vk) a.e., x(vk) = vl; x(rh
k) = rh
l y(vk) 2 [￿K;+K] and x(vk) 2 [rh
l ;vl];
where K is a large number. Program PR
k satis￿es all the conditions of the Filipov-Cesari Theorem
(see Cesari (1983)). By that theorem, we know that there exists a measurable function y(￿) that
solves PR
k . By the equivalence of PR
k and PR
k , it then follows that PR
k admits a piece-wise absolutely
continuous maximizer ~ tk(￿). Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 Consider the function ￿(￿) implicitly de￿ned by
￿h
k(vk;￿(vk)) = 0: (31)
Let ~ vk ￿ inffvk 2 [vk;rh
k] :(31) admits a solutiong. The solution to PR
k is given by
~ tk(vk) =
(
￿ vl if vk 2 [vk; ~ vk]
￿(vk) if vk 2 (~ vk;rh
k]:
(32)
Proof of Lemma 5. From Lemma 4, we know that PR
k admits a piece-wise absolutely continuous
solution. Standard results from calculus of variations then imply that such solution ~ tk(￿) must satisfy
the Euler equation at any interval I ￿ [vk;rh
k] where its image ~ tk(vk) 2 (rh
l ;vl). The Euler equation
associated with program PR
k is given by (31). Condition SR ensures that (i) there exists a ~ vk 2 [vk;rh
k)
such that (31) admits a solution if and only if vk 2 [~ vk;rh
k]; (ii) that at any point vk 2 [~ vk;rh
k] such








, and (iii) that ￿(￿) is continuous and
strictly decreasing over [~ vk;rh
k]:
When ~ vk > vk, (31) admits no solution at any point vk 2 [vk; ~ vk], in which case ~ tk(vk) 2 frh
l ;vlg.
Because ’h
k(vk) < 0 for all vk 2 [vk; ~ vk] and because ^ gk(￿) is decreasing, it is then immediate from
inspecting the objective (29) that ~ tk(vk) = ￿ vl for all vk 2 [vk; ~ vk].
It remains to show that ~ tk(vk) = ￿(vk) for all vk 2 [~ vk;rh
k]. Because the objective function in
PR
k is not concave in (tk;t0
k) for all vk, we cannot appeal to standard su¢ ciency arguments. Instead,
using the fact that the Euler equation is a necessary optimality condition for interior points, we will
35prove that ~ tk(vk) = ￿(vk) by arguing that there is no function ^ tk(￿) that improves upon ~ tk(￿) and such
that ^ tk(￿) coincides with ~ tk(￿) except on an interval (v1
k;v2
k) ￿ [~ vk;rh
k] over which ^ th
k(vk) 2 frh
l ;vlg.
To see that this is true, ￿x an arbitrary (v1
k;v2
k) ￿ [~ vk;rh
k] and consider the problem that consists
in choosing optimally a step function ^ tk(￿) : (v1
k;v2
k) ! frh
l ;vlg. Because step functions are such that
^ t0
k(vk) = 0 at all points of continuity and because ’h
k(vk) < 0 for all vk 2 (v1
k;v2
k), it follows that the
optimal step function is given by ^ tk(vk) = vl for all vk 2 (v1
k;v2
k). Notice that the value attained
by the objective (29) over the interval (v1
k;v2
k) under such step function is zero. Instead, an interior
control tk(￿) : (v1
k;v2
k) ! (rh
l ;vl) over the same interval with derivative
t0
k(vk) <
^ gk(tk(vk)) ￿ ’h
k(vk) ￿ fv
k(vk)
^ gl(vk) ￿ ’h
l (tk(vk)) ￿ fv
l (tk(vk))
for all vk 2 (v1
k;v2
k) yields a strictly positive valuation. This proves that the solution to PR
k must
indeed satisfy the Euler equation (31) for all vk 2 [~ vk;rh
k]. Together with the property established
above that ~ tk(vk) = ￿ vl for all vk 2 [vk; ~ vk]; this establishes that the unique piece-wise absolutely
continuous function that solves PR
k is the control ~ tk(￿) that satis￿es (32). Q.E.D.
Denote by maxfPR
k g the value of program PR
k (i.e., the value of the objective (29) evaluated
under the control ~ th
k(￿) de￿ned in Lemma 5). Then denote by supfPAu
k g and supfPF
k g the supremum
of programs PAu
k and PF
k , respectively. Note that we write sup rather than max as, a priori, a
solution to these problems might not exist.
Lemma 6 supfPF
k g = supfPAu
k g = maxfPR
k g.
Proof of Lemma 6. Clearly, supfPF
k g ￿ supfPAu
k g, for PAu
k is more constrained than PF
k .
Next note that supfPF
k g = supf ^ PF
k g where ^ PF
k coincides with PF
k except that !k is constrained to
be equal to vk and tk(vk) is constrained to be equal to ￿ vl. This follows from the fact that excluding
types below a threshold !0
k gives the same value as setting tk(vk) = ￿ vl for all vk 2 [vk;!0
k). That
supf ^ PF
k g = supfPAu
k g then follows from the fact any pair of measurable functions tk(￿);tl(￿) satisfying
conditions (20), (21) and (24), with !k = vk and tk(vk) = ￿ vl can be approximated arbitrarily well
in the L2-norm by a pair of functions satisfying conditions (20), (26) and (27). That maxfPR
k g ￿
supfPAu
k g follows from the fact that PR
k is a relaxed version of PAu
k . That maxfPR
k g = supfPAu
k g in
turn follows from the fact that the solution ~ th
k(￿) to PR
k can be approximated arbitrarily well in the
L2-norm by a function tk(￿) that is continuous and strictly decreasing. Q.E.D.
From the results above, we are now in a position to exhibit the solution to Pk
F. Let !h
k = ~ vk; where
~ vk is the threshold de￿ned in Lemma 5. Next for any vk 2 [~ vk;rh
k], let th
k(vk) = ~ tk(vk) where ~ tk(￿) is




l ;vl]; let tk
l (￿) : [rh
l ;vl] ! [!h
k;rh
k]
be the unique function that satis￿es (20). It is clear that the tripe !h
k;th
k(￿);th
l (￿) constructed this
way satis￿es conditions (20), (21) and (24), and is therefore a feasible candidate for program PF
k : It
36is also immediate that the value of the objective (23) in PF
k evaluated at !h
k;th
k(￿);th
l (￿) is the same
as maxfPR
k g: From Lemma 6, we then conclude that !h
k;th
k(￿);th
l (￿) is a solution to PF
k .
Applying the construction above to k = A;B and combining the solution to program PF
A with
the solution to program PF






k2fA;Bg to program PF.
By inspection, it is easy to see that the corresponding rule is maximally separating. Furthermore,
from the arguments in Lemma 5, one can easily verify that there is exclusion at the bottom on side k
(and no bunching at the top on side l) if ~ vk > vk and bunching at the top on side l (and no exclusion




k; ￿ vl) = 0, or equivalently  h
k(v0
k) +  h
l (￿ vl) = 0. Condition SR along with the fact
that signf￿h
k(vk;vl)g = signf h
k(vk)+ h
l (vl)g then implies that 4h
k(vk; ￿ vl) = 4h
l (￿ vl;vk) < 0: Hence,
whenever 4h
k(vk; ￿ vl) = 4h
l (￿ vl;vk) < 0, there is exclusion at the bottom on side k and no bunching
at the top on side l. Symmetrically, 4h
l (vl; ￿ vk) = 4h
k(￿ vk;vl) < 0 implies that there is exclusion at
the bottom on side l and no bunching at the top on of side k, as stated in the proposition.
Next, consider the case where ~ vk = vk: In this case there exists a ￿(vk) 2 [rh
l ;vl] such that
4h
k(vk;￿(vk)) = 0; or equivalently  h
k(vk) +  h
l (￿(vk)) = 0. Assume ￿rst that ￿(vk) < vl: By
Condition SR, it then follows that  h
k(vk)+ h
l (￿ vl) > 0 or, equivalently, that 4h
k(vk; ￿ vl) = 4h
l (￿ vl;vk) >
0: Hence, whenever 4h
k(vk; ￿ vl) = 4h
l (￿ vl;vk) > 0, there is no exclusion at the bottom on side k and
bunching at the top on side l. Symmetrically, 4h
l (vl; ￿ vk) = 4h
k(￿ vk;vl) > 0 implies that there is
bunching at the top on side k and no exclusion at the bottom on side l, as stated in the proposition.
Next, consider the case where ￿(vk) = vl. In this case !h
k = vk and th
k(vk) = ￿ vl. This is the
knife-edge case where 4h
k(vk; ￿ vl) = 4h
l (￿ vl;vk) = 0 in which there is neither bunching at the top on
side l nor exclusion at the bottom on side k. Q.E.D.





k denote the size of the matching set that each
agent with valuation vk obtains under the mechanism Mh. Using (4), for any qk 2 xh
k(Vk), i.e., for



















￿￿1 (qk) ￿ inffvk : xh
k(vk) = qkg is the generalized inverse of xh





￿￿1 (qk) is strictly increasing and di⁄erentiable at any qk in the image of the











k]: Therefore, from the integral formula
above, we get that the optimal price schedules ￿h
k(￿) are di⁄erentiable at any quantity qk in the image





















k(vk)jk = qk. Substituting the elasticity formula (12) and the marginal price formula (33)


































for vk such that jsh
k(vk)jk = qk; then leads to the Euler equation (10). Q.E.D.
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1. Proofs omitted in the main text
Proof of Proposition 4. The result trivially holds when 4W
k (vk;vl) ￿ 0, for in this case the
welfare-maximizing matching rule always employs a single complete network. Thus suppose that
4W
k (vk;vl) < 0: Because ’P
k (vk) ￿ ’W
k (vk) for all vk 2 [vk;vk], with strict inequality for all vk < ￿ vk;
then 4P
k (vk;vl) is also strictly negative. Furthermore, the same property implies that  P
k (vk) ￿
 W
k (vk) for all vk 2 [vk;vk]: Now recall, from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3, that the
h-optimal rule exhibits exclusion at the bottom on side k if and only if 4h
k(vk; ￿ vl) = 4h
l (￿ vl;vk) < 0
or, equivalently, if and only if  h
k(vk) +  h
l (￿ vl) < 0: In this case, the threshold !h
k is the unique
solution to  h
k(!h
k) +  h
l (￿ vl) = 0: The fact that !P
k ￿ !W
k then follows directly from the ranking
between  P
k (￿) and  W
k (￿) along with the strict monotonicity of these functions. This establishes the
exclusion e⁄ect.
Next, take any vk > !P
k (￿ !W
k ) and suppose that tW
k (vk) > vl. The threshold tW
k (vk) then solves
 W
k (vk) +  W
l (tW
k (vk)) = 0: The same monotonicities discussed above then imply that tP
k (vk) >
tW
k (vk): This establishes the isolation e⁄ect. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Hereafter, we use the annotation "^" for all variables in the mechan-
ism ^ MP corresponding to the new distribution ^ F￿
k (￿j￿) and continue to denote the variables in the
mechanism MP corresponding to the original distribution F￿
k (￿j￿) without annotation. By de￿nition,
we have that ^  
P
k (vk) ￿  P
k (vk) for all vk ￿ rP
k while ^  
P
k (vk) ￿  P
k (vk) for all vk ￿ rP
k . Recall, from
the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3, that for any vk < !P
k ; ￿P
k (vk; ￿ vl) < 0 or, equivalently,
 P
k (vk) +  P
l (￿ vl) < 0; whereas for any vk 2 (!k;rP
k ]; tP
k (vk) satis￿es  P
k (vk) +  P
l (tP
k (vk)) = 0: The
ranking between ^  
P
k (￿) and  P
k ￿), along with the strict monotonicity of these functions then implies
that ^ !P
k ￿ !P
k and, for any vk 2 [!P
k ;rP
k ]; ^ tP
k (vk) ￿ tP






l (vl) for all vk > rP
k ; all vl; we have that ^ tP
k (vk) ￿ tP
k (vk) for all vk > rP
k : This completes
the proof of part (1) in the Proposition.
Next consider part (2). Note that, because Fl is unchanged, the result in part 1 implies that
j^ sk(vk)jk ￿ jsk(vk)jk if and only if vk ￿ rP
k . Using (4), note that for all types ￿k with valuation
vk ￿ rP
k
￿k(￿k; ^ MP) =
Z vk
vk
j^ sk(~ vk)jk d~ vk ￿ ￿k(￿k;MP) =
Z vk
vk
jsk(~ vk)jk d~ vk:
Furthermore, since j^ sk(vk)jk ￿ jsk(vk)jk for all vk ￿ rP
k , there exists a threshold type ^ ￿k > rP
k
(possibly equal to ￿ vk) such that ￿k(￿k; ^ MP) ￿ ￿k(￿k;MP) if and only if vk ￿ ^ ￿k, which establishes
part 2 in the proposition. Q.E.D.






k denote the quality of the matching set that







1corresponding quantity under the new mechanism. Using (4), for any q 2 xk(Vk) \ ^ xk(Vk); i.e., for
any q o⁄ered both under MP and ^ MP,
￿P














k (q) ￿ inffvk : xk(vk) = qg is the generalized inverse of xk(￿) and ^ x￿1
k (q) = inffvk : ^ xk(vk) =
qg the corresponding inverse for ^ xk(￿): We thus have that
￿P










[^ xk(v) ￿ q]dv:
From the results in Proposition 6, we know that [xk(vk) ￿ ^ xk(vk)][vk ￿ rP
k ] ￿ 0 with xk(rP
k ) =
^ xk(rP
k ): Therefore, for all q 2 xk(Vk) \ ^ xk(Vk); with q ￿ xk(rP
k ) = ^ xk(rP
k );
￿P






















whereas for q ￿ xk(rP
k ) = ^ xk(rP
k ),
￿P















[^ xk(v) ￿ q]dv
= ￿P
k (xk(rP












[^ xk(v) ￿ q]dv
= ￿P
k (xk(rP
k )) ￿ ^ ￿P
k (xk(rP
k )) +
















2Integrating by parts, using the fact that xk(rP
k ) = ^ xk(rP
k ), and changing variables we have that
















































k (z) ￿ x￿1
k (z))dz:
Because ^ x￿1
k (z) ￿ x￿1
k (z) for z > xk(rP
k ), we then conclude that the price di⁄erential ￿P
k (q)￿ ^ ￿P
k (q);
which is positive at q = xk(rP
k ) = ^ xk(rP
k ); declines as q grows above xk(rP
k ): Going back to the original






















k (q) ￿ ￿P
k (q) if and only if q ￿ ^ qk. This establishes the result. Q.E.D.
2. E⁄ects of Changes in Demand Elasticity
In this part, we formally prove the claims in Section 3.5 in the main text about the e⁄ects of
changes in demand elasticity on matching sets and prices, under pro￿t maximization.
De￿nition 7 (higher elasticity) Side k is less elastic under distribution ~ Fk than under distribu-
tion Fk if ~ Fv
k dominates Fv
k in the hazard-rate order, and, for any vk; ~ F￿
k (￿jvk) = F￿
k (￿jvk).21
The next proposition extends the results in Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Armstrong (2006) for
single-networks to the case of a two-sided platform that price-discriminates by o⁄ering menus of
networks.
Proposition A1 (e⁄ects of changes in elasticity on matching sets and payo⁄s). In
addition to Conditions PA and SR, suppose that network e⁄ects are linear (i.e., gA(x) = gB(x) = x),
and that 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0. If the elasticity of side k decreases, then the platform moves from a matching
rule sP
k (￿) to a matching rule ~ sP
k (￿) such that:
1. ~ sP
k (vk) ￿ sP
k (vk) for all vk 2 Vk,
2. ￿k(￿k; ~ MP) < ￿k(￿k;MP) for all vk ￿ !P
k .
Proof of Proposition A1. Denote by ~  
P
k (vk) the  -function associated with the new distribu-
tion ~ Fv
k(￿), and by ~ ’P
k (vk) the virtual valuations associated with ~ Fv
k(￿). Since ~ Fv
k(￿) dominates Fv
k(￿)
in the hazard rate order, it follows that ~ ’P
k (vk) ￿ ’P
k (vk) and, because gk(￿) and gl(￿) are linear,
~  
P
k (vk) ￿  P
k (vk) for all vk 2 Vk. Therefore for all vk 2 Vk,
~  
P
k (vk) +  P
l (tP
k (vk)) <  P
k (vk) +  P
l (tP
k (vk)):
From the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3, we then have that ~ !P
k ￿ !P
k and ~ tP
k (vk) ￿ tP
k (vk)
for vk; which establishes part 1. For Part 2 note that, because Fl is unchanged, it then follows that












k (vk) for all vk 2 Vk.
3j~ sk(vk)jk ￿ jsk(vk)jk for all vk ￿ !P
k . Furthermore, because necessarily j~ sk(vk)jk < jsk(vk)jk for all
vk < rP
k ; we have that ￿k(￿k; ~ MP) < ￿k(￿k;MP) for all vk ￿ !P
k . Q.E.D.
The next corollary builds on the preceding Proposition A1 to determine the e⁄ects of a decrease
in the elasticity on side k on the price schedule ￿P
k (￿).
Corollary A1 (e⁄ects of changes in elasticity on prices) In addition to Conditions PA and
SR, suppose that network e⁄ects are linear (i.e., gA(x) = gB(x) = x), and that 4h
k(vk;vl) < 0. If
the elasticity of side k decreases, then the platform switches from a price schedule ￿P
k (￿) to a price
schedule ~ ￿P
k (￿) such that ~ ￿P(q) ￿ ￿P
k (q) for all q. Furthermore, in the case where network e⁄ects
depend only on quantities (i.e., ￿l(￿) ￿ 1), the marginal price for each quantity q that is o⁄ered both
under the old and the new distribution increases, that is, d~ ￿P
k (q)=dq > d￿P
k (q)=dq:
Proof of Corollary A1. Because j~ sk(vk)jk ￿ jsk(vk)jk for all vk 2 Vk, the result that
~ ￿P(q) ￿ ￿P
k (q) for all q follows from the same steps as in the proof of Corollary 3. The result for the
marginal prices follows from Proposition 5. To see this, ￿rst note that, for each quantity q o⁄ered both
























: To see this, re-



































































we then have that the right-hand-side in the formula for the marginal prices in Proposition 5 is
una⁄ected by the shock. This result, together with the fact that, for any given marginal price
d￿P
k (qk)=dqk on side k, a decrease in elasticity on side k implies that the right-hand-side in the same
formula is smaller when evaluated at the same marginal price and the fact that the right-hand-side
is increasing in d￿
p
k(qk)=dqk then gives the result. Q.E.D.
4